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ABSTRACT
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Doctors face situations within the medical arena in which their conscience -- as a person
and as a professional -- conflicts with patient autonomy. Consider the terminally ill patient who
wishes to end all treatment and elect to receive assisted suicide, and his physician who believes
that aiding in death is a moral wrong. This creates a conflict of interests between physician and
patient.
Historically, a paternalistic model of physician-patient interaction was employed to deal
with dilemmas, contributing to infringement of patient’s rights and a lack of understanding of
ethics on the part of the physician. This manifests as the physician having a limited outlook of
treatment.
An increased emphasis on ethics training and implementation of the interpretive model of
interaction within medical schools is necessary in order to retain the humanity and compassion of
the medical profession. Implementing this revised model will protect the morals of both patient
and physician, as it allows conscientious objection: a physician’s refusal of providing a certain
treatment on the basis of personal morals that conflict with one or more of the values within
medicine.
However, these requests for conscientious objection will not always be honored by the
hospital if there are serious infringements upon the rights of the patient, causing a give and take
of morality. It is necessary for physicians to be competent in the realm of ethics to communicate
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with patients on a human level and provide treatment that is in line with many of the conflicting
tensions that physicians face.

Key Words: conscientious objection, ethics training, physician, dilemmas, morals, moral
conflicts, models of interaction, give and take
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Doctors may face situations within the medical arena in which their conscience, as a
person and as a professional and which is guided by their morals and autonomy, conflicts with
the patient’s autonomy. In these cases, the doctor may refuse treatment and refer or recommend
the patient receive treatment elsewhere, or if no alternative help is available, should provide the
treatment because of his or her special duties as a physician within the medical community. It is
important to respect both the doctor’s conscience and autonomy and the patient’s autonomy as
the doctor takes an oath to uphold the primary principles of medicine. These principles include
actively trying to “do no unnecessary harm” to the patient and respect autonomy and notion of
‘the good’.

Referring the patient to another doctor in these scenarios provides a realistic

solution, dissolving the immediate conflict and honoring autonomy of both parties, but does not
entirely resolve the conflict, as the physician should still aid the patient in finding a physician
willing to perform the treatment that he or she finds inherently wrong. However, when this
course of action is not possible, the doctor should provide the desired treatment because the
needs of the patient ultimately take priority in the medical arena according to medical principles.
These two scenarios exemplify the ‘give and take’ of medical morality: though respect for
autonomy is being honored, a conflict of conscience will always remain.

There are several

objections to the practice of conscientious objection to be addressed, including accusations of
malpractice, loss of integrity for the medical community, and inequity.

However, these

objections are baseless in that not allowing conscientious objection would be far more
detrimental to the profession of medicine than would be forcing physicians to provide treatments
that they find deeply morally troubling.

The medical community has been founded on
!1

relationships centered on trust and respect for autonomy. If the autonomy of physicians are not
equally respected, then the respect within the medical community overall will be tarnished,
leading physicians to act in ways that infringe upon patient rights. Physicians who feel they
cannot openly and honestly communicate and act in a way that is in accordance with their
autonomy may begin to act paternalistically and not provide all available treatment options in
fear of being forced to perform a procedure that they find in contrast with their conscience and
autonomy. Because of the unique nature of medicine, the autonomy of the patient is ultimately
given priority, but the autonomy of the physician should also be honored to uphold the honor and
respect within the realm of medicine.
The ethical duties of physicians are diverse yet are closely interrelated and dependent on
each value of medicine; caring, also referred to as beneficence, highlights the integral role
emotion plays in ethics (Rhodes 2008:76). Doctors should be perceived as compassionate by
their patients, and doctors should actually feel compassion for their patients. Related to this
value is respect for autonomy, which allows patients to trust their doctors and be confident that
their physicians will not violate their basic rights (Rhodes 2008:77). One patient’s idea of the
good may potentially be very different from another patient’s conception of the same goal. In
attaining a good end for each patient, different resources may have to be used. For example, two
different patients may have two different conceptions of the good — for one, the good may entail
exhausting all possible and experimental treatment options until death from a fatal disease, while
the other patient may choose to fight until they feel they cannot anymore and then will choose
alternative intervention such as assisted suicide. In these two situations, a physician will be
required to provide much different treatment or options in order to achieve an end which is good
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for the patient. This may cause a conflict of interest for the physician, whose personal autonomy
may not exist harmoniously with the patient’s conception of the good. For another example,
consider a patient who has been diagnosed with a curable form of cancer, who has a 60% chance
of survival if he chooses to undergo chemotherapy. The physician, who is abiding by the rules of
medicine, allows the patient to choose whether he wants to receive chemotherapy or not. The
patient autonomously chooses to not subject himself to chemotherapy, as he feels that at his age,
he has experienced a full life and would prefer to not have to experience the pain and suffering
associated with chemotherapy and instead live out the rest of his life with palliative assistance.
The physician might disagree with this decision, as there is a relatively good chance of survival
if the patient decides to pursue chemotherapy, and the physician conceptualizes the good as
aiming towards survival at all costs. The physician should then accept that he and his patient
consider a good end in different ways but ultimately honor the wishes of his rational patient in
order to avoid suffering for the patient. Therefore, there should be adequate resources for these
patients and physicians alike to have access to, including a diverse physician population and the
ability to refrain from providing or receiving treatment, resulting in justice for those seeking
treatment and providing it. A diverse physician population will further the diversity of thought
within the medical arena, normalizing differing opinions and beliefs held by the overall
population that may not have received much attention historically by medicine. There are many
situations in which all possible courses of action will cause at least some suffering.

It is a

physician’s duty to weigh on all levels -- mental, spiritual, religious, and physical -- which action
will cause the least amount of suffering for his or her patient. The moral plan of action to take is
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the one where the least amount of suffering is experienced by both the patient; however, in this
same line of reasoning, respect for physician autonomy should be honored.
Physicians are obligated to take a comprehensive approach to medicine, weighing the
potential physical, mental, spiritual, and general effects that a certain treatment may have in
order to conform with the patient’s conception of the good. Similarly, the physician’s autonomy
and conception of the good on all levels should be honored. A physician has a right to request to
refuse treatment when weighing conflicts if he feels that providing treatment would cause more
harm and suffering to himself -- spiritually, emotionally, or mentally -- than finding a different
physician to perform the procedure would for the patient, and secondly, that the values he feel
will be violated in performing the procedure are in line with the values of medicine.

The

interests of the physician and patient are closely interrelated, though potentially conflictual,
making it difficult to find a balance between them. The patient’s perception of the good is
concerned with the moral, goal-oriented, and autonomous actions that the patient believes are
good, which are in accordance with the overall goals for the good life of rational humans overall
(Ivanhoe, et al. 2007:70-71). The spiritual good, which for some is the most important good that
can be satisfied by clinical medicine, refers not only to religious belief, but the patient’s
conception of what the ultimate answers are, such as ‘What is it to be human? What meanings
should be attached to life?, and so on.

In brief, it is the patient’s own ‘philosophy of

life.’” (Ivanhoe, et al. 2007:71). The medical good relates most closely to the objective goals of
medicine, that is healing, relieving pain, and carrying out the medical techné (Ivanhoe, et al.
2007:70). However, what is the medical good is not necessarily congruent with other interests;
for example, a decision consistent with the medical good might cause psychological suffering or
!4

religious distress to the patient, as well as be at odds with what is defined as the good for rational
humans (Ivanhoe, et al. 2007:71). It is the physician’s duty to balance these interests and provide
treatment that is effective on all levels, for both himself and the patient. All of these interests are
interests that are not unique to one who is in the role of a patient; they are very humanistic values
which should be balanced in order to retain humanity and morality. It is crucial that physicians
have a right to maintain their autonomy just as much as the patient.
It still may not be obvious how a physician’s obligations to the medical field may force
him to act in a way in which a certain give and take of ethics is necessary.

Consider the

following: a physician has duties to his patient treat efficiently and effectively, and respect
patient autonomy. A physician also has duties to the medical field and the institution to which he
belongs to including upholding the honor of the medical community, treating patients in a moral
way, and doing no harm through perceived recklessness, endangerment, or ignorance.

The

physician also has obligations to himself as a rational individual to uphold his moral integrity
and abide by his own conception of the good and autonomy. Because a physician may face
serious punishment for failure to fulfill these obligations such as being sued by patients,
imparting false knowledge, or acting in a negligent way, he may feel that his actions are being
scrutinized and that he cannot act in accordance with his personal autonomy and values. This is
dangerous because of the suffering that can occur for the physicians, resulting in adequate care
not being provided if the physician feels that he should not be providing this treatment. For
example, a physician may be forced to provide a certain treatment — such as an abortion — but
feel that he is committing an unforgivable religious and moral wrongdoing, therefore
experiencing high levels of distress and suffering in attempting to protect the interests of the
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patient and of the medical field. Though it is commendable of the physician to do so, it is
actually creating a dangerous and negative environment for the physicians and patients. It is
necessary that physicians practice medicine with confidence and with honor, and by forcing
physicians to provide treatments that seriously conflict with their values in line with the values of
medicine, the professionalism and trust within the medical profession is being tarnished. It is
necessary that physicians have their autonomy honored with the same weight as the patients,
though in a unique way due to the special obligations that physicians have to themselves, the
medical community, and their patients.
It is possible to preemptively remedy these potential conflicts by implementing a change
in the ethics training of future physicians in medical schools and encouraging an interpretive
model of patient-physician interaction to be used. By changing ethics training to emphasize the
importance of retaining autonomy, humanity, compassion, and forgiveness, physicians will
understand how to better communicate their morals and values as well as practice medicine
which is congruent with the values of the medical realm, the values of the patient, and the
personal autonomy of the doctor. Additionally, the physician will learn to effectively balance
external pressures with the give and take of morals that he is subjected to, while conscientious
objection will allow the autonomy of the physician to be respected, yet there will still be an
infringement upon the conscience of the physician as he is ultimately required to refer the patient
to a different doctor who is willing to perform the treatment he finds conflictual with his values.
This infringement occurs because the physician, while acting autonomously in not physically
performing the procedure, should still accept that his conscience will be conflicted as he should
still acknowledge that the patient will receive the procedure and that the physician should help
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the patient receive that procedure in referring her to a different physician.

The interpretive

model of interaction, which encourages the physician to view the patient as a whole and aid the
patient in making an informed decision in line with her conception of the good, will bolster the
utility of ethics training as it encourages the importance of the main values which medicine
should honor: respect for autonomy, the duty to treat the patient, and act with humanity and
compassion.
In order to explain and address the formation of these moral conflicts that arise within
medicine, it is necessary to explore how physicians are socialized and in turn, how they learn
professional values and how to act in a medical environment when interacting with peers and
patients through professional socialization and through ethics training in medical school. This
then leads to a discussion of doctor-patient models that have been adhered to throughout history
and a recommendation of a new model to adopt. This model will place a larger emphasis on
equal collaboration between physician and patient, which will create a more accepting and
understanding environment, leading to the possibility of conscientious objection. The specifics of
conscientious objection will be discussed and two case studies surrounding conscientious
objection of physician-assisted suicide and abortion will be provided, addressing objections to
the theory as well. By completing a critical analysis and review of conflicts of conscience that
are experienced within medicine, it will be possible to view medicine in a new and reformed way
in which the give and take of morals that physicians are subjected to is understood, allowing a
suggestion for reform to be made.
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Chapter 2: Professional Socialization of Medicine and Learning of Values
The goal of medical school is to shape physicians’ identities in accordance with being an
effective and professional physician. However, many future physicians enter medical school
with preconceived notions of what it means to be a doctor, what medical school is like, and what
the profession is overall. These conceptions are often shaped by the media, experiences from the
other side of medicine, as a patient, and medical students and medical student hopefuls’ sharing
of stories (Weaver et al., 2011; 1220). In order to successfully combat these ideas and meet the
needs of our medical community by educating future physicians, it is crucial that we understand
the aspects of society that shape the physician’s identity as a professional.
Professional identity is how one perceives oneself as a competent professional (Weaver
et al., 2011:1221). Social identity theory, the most applicable theory to the physician as a
professional, explains that an individual has multiple roles and social identities that they take on
as they move through different social settings. This theory takes on three groupings:
categorization, identification, and comparison. Categorization refers to individuals categorizing
others into natural groupings, identification is when people label those in the same group as
similar to them and those who are not in the group as dissimilar, and lastly, comparison refers to
individuals comparing themselves with others and considering themselves members of a group
that has a positive association attached to it (Hogg 1988).
Having a strong professional identity is of utmost importance in effectively carrying
out medical treatment; physicians should be able to balance individual autonomy and a strong
ethical compass as well as knowledge for practicing medicine in order to be a successful doctor
(Weaver et al., 2011;1221). The process of developing a professional identity is one that is long!8

term and includes integrating one’s personally-held morals with those that are acceptable and in
line with the overall profession. Many of the aspects of professionalism may be deemed
subjective based on the profession, but in actuality, have been passed down throughout centuries
of physicians, most often in a practice known as role-modeling (Weaver et al., 2011:1221). Role
models are very influential when it comes to forming professional identity; subordinates mimic
the behavior of successful, well-respected physicians, coming to understand what is expected in
a clinical setting. Role-modeling builds confidence through interactions with patients, peers, and
members of the medical community; having confidence in addition to clinical competence
improves the medical community as well as the development of one’s professional identity as a
physician (Weaver et al. 2011:1221).
Physicians are constantly seeking to become better professionals by building on the
foundation that has been laid throughout their undergraduate and medical school training (Stern,
et al. 2006:1794). Becoming a professional does not just include lectures, clinics, and testing,
but informal socialization like conversations in the cafeteria (Stern, et al. 2006:1794). The
development of humanistic approaches and empathetic attitudes are developed through the
professionalization of medical students through rituals such as the white-coat ceremony but also
through providing experiences (Stern et al. 2006:1975).
Future physicians are under a great deal of pressure; they are expected to possess
certain skills, attributes, and knowledge in order to be considered a good doctor (Lindberg
2009:242). These traits are acquired through the process of professional socialization, both
informal and formal. Most medical students learn their professional values through rolemodeling, acting in a way which mimics their superiors because they perceive their superiors to
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be knowledgeable and respected — traits which these future physicians hope to embody one day.
It is important that students learn from their teachers — to a limit. While conformity is definitely
a necessary component of professional socialization, there should also be a healthy amount of
challenging, questioning, and protesting of their superiors in order to develop a sophisticated and
strong sense of autonomy (Lindberg 2009:242). In medicine, these oppositions are rarely made
due to the intimidating nature of the medical community.
Six main values were observed to be important to future physicians: wisdom, discipline,
humility, empathy, maturity and strength (Lindberg 2009:242). Wisdom refers to a certain set of
knowledge a physician has; it is not only knowledge of medicine, but of the overall world, and
refers to the ability to use this knowledge to solve problems and make good judgements on
behalf of the patient and the entire medical community as a whole (Lindberg 2009:244). A good
doctor is also a disciplined one, who is hardworking, well-studied, and adheres to his duties. The
disciplined doctor achieves his goals in a fast and efficient way even in high-stress situations
(Lindberg 2009:244). Physicians are also expected to have humility and not be overly confident
to the point of becoming hubris; being a physician necessitates being able to constantly learn
from mistakes and take in new knowledge, participating in life-long learning (Lindberg
2009:245). Physicians should also be able to interact with patients and other physicians in a nonjudgmental way. This includes being able to ‘read’ patients and deduce what help they truly
need, as opposed to what they state openly (Lindberg 2009:245). Just as important as this is the
necessity of maturity, which allows physicians to understand the wants and needs of their
patients in a respectful way. Maturity is not a virtue which is expressed solely in the medical
context, though — physicians and future physicians are expected to have a certain understanding
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of the world outside of medicine. Maturity is a trait which is hard to define, which does not
necessarily come with the medical training per se, but with age and experience (Lindberg
2009:246). Lastly, strength has been listed as a necessary virtue that a good physician should
exemplify. Strength means standing by difficult decisions and being able to speak your mind
with authority (Lindberg 2009:246). All of these virtues are requisite in having a complete
understanding of individual autonomy as well as effective physician-patient interactions, and
should be present in all theoretical physician-patient models in order to ensure a respectful and
well-informed interaction.
For every positive virtue that these future physicians wished to embody, there are traits
that are actively avoided during the socialization process. These include lacking credibility,
being viewed by the patients as incompetent, not being good enough to be a doctor, being
stressed, feeling like an outsider within the medical community, and being humiliated (Pitkala et
al. 2003:155). Many students reported feeling inferior to hospital staff and feared that they were
incompetent. Medical school has been reported to be a “stressful, anxiety-provoking, and
traumatizing experience” (Pitkala et al., 2003;155). It has been said that it is necessary to
suppress inner feelings and objectify patients for self-preservation and wellbeing (Pitkala et al.,
2003:155). Because of the intense culture of medical school, students sometimes approach it
with a kind of superficiality, being more concerned with how they appear in front of their role
models and superiors than with how effectively they are treating patients and whether or not they
are acting ethically according to their standards, the standards of medicine, and the standards of
their patients.
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In the first year of medical school, which is arguably the most influential year
regarding professional development, medical students have reported feeling that they lack
credibility and are concerned with being a good enough doctor, being viewed positively by
patients, feeling like an outsider, and living in fear of being humiliated (Pitkala et al., 158).
These negative fears and potential experiences contribute significantly to the professional
development of medical students. Because these future physicians have so many different forces
acting on them, sometimes the underlying understanding of the ethics of medicine will be
neglected because physicians are cultivating their professional identity.
It can be argued that a strong professional identity is formed off of superficial grounds,
resulting in the negligence of other areas such as ethics education and physician-patient
interaction. This also stems from the three groupings of social identity theory being at work:
categorization explains the medical students viewing themselves as one unique group with a
unique set of skills (McLeod 2008). This categorization can be helpful to physicians, as it allows
them to express openly some of the common dilemmas and pressures that they face as well as
form a bond with other members of the medical community. However, extreme categorization
can be alienating if physicians from certain specialties begin to group together and look down on
physicians from a different area, or if the entirety of physicians looks down on the nurses or aids
in the hospital. Medicine is a collaborative effort and categorization threatens to become too
esoteric and compartmentalized. Identification explains medical students identifying with the
entire medical community and viewing those who are not members of that community as ‘other,’
such as considering patients to be subordinate with an entirely different set of morals (McLeod
2008). It is important for physicians to acknowledge the importance and uniqueness of the type
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of knowledge they have without acting as if they are inherently superior to their patients. Doing
so would escalate the healthy level of paternalism to being unhealthy and arrogant. Lastly,
comparison refers to the title of ‘doctor’ and how medical students will attach themselves to that
label and think highly of themselves because of it (McLeod 2008). Again, when a physician is
too confident in his skills and judgement solely because of his title, there is an imminent threat to
the autonomy of his patients; if a physician feels that she is immune to making mistakes or lapses
in judgement, then the humanity of medicine disappears because the patient ceases to be
recognized as a rational being with values and emotions. All of these factors come into play and
contribute to the development of a physician’s professional social identity. However, they can
also lead to issues which contribute to having an inadequate understanding of ethics, acting
overly paternalistic, and emotionally detaching.
The professional socialization of medicine has emphasized collaboration among
physicians, detachment of emotions, callousness in practicing medicine and delivering results,
and trust in medicine and medical professionals (Vinson 2006: 1365). However, many students
still lack in the areas which require vulnerability: collaboration and trust. An ethnography of
American medical schools has explained how medical students are taught to address physicianpatient encounters while still adhering to the guidelines of a collaborative relationship (Vinson
2016: 1365). There is an emphasis on paternalism within these encounters, which is concerned
with physicians making the important medical decisions regarding treatment options and courses
of action and then persuading patients to agree with their decisions throughout the process. This
is known as “constrained collaboration,” a technique used by physicians to ideally accomplish
the goals of the physician without obviously violating patient autonomy (Vinson 2016: 1364).
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Faculty physicians teach medical students in particular to shape a patient’s response using
certain situational and conversational techniques taught to them in medical school in accordance
with constrained collaboration. The students are taught to reinforce a strict patient-physician
dichotomy of roles, highlighting that the physician knows best and gives the orders, and the
patient consents willingly, knowing as “making the deal” (Vinson 2016: 1372). The physician
then “closes the deal” by asking confirmation questions about what the patient has been told and
asking him to repeat what he heard and if he understood her instructions. If the patient shows
any signs of negative emotion such as fear, anger, or hesitancy, the medical student was
instructed to address those concerns and persuade the patient that the plan of action would still be
in his best interest and that his concerns were unnecessary (Vinson 2016: 1374).
In U.S. medical healthcare, the needs of the patient should take priority, and the
physicians should have remedies to whatever may ail the patient. The physicians should then
shape the medical intervention to fit with the desires of the patient, proving that constrained
collaboration is incongruent with the principles of medicine such as respect for autonomy. This
process, in contrast to its goals, is manipulative and the issues of paternalism and removal of
patient autonomy are still present. This method of collaboration is a result of current models of
ethics education in medical schools, in which the physician is encouraged to believe she is the
most fit to make decisions on behalf of the patient because she is of supreme virtuous character.
There is a unique paradox which occurs in uncertain clinical decisions. In these situations,
physicians are more likely to abandon paternalism and put all decision-making responsibility on
the patient (Diamond-Brown 2016:109). This is dangerous because physicians are professionals
and need to exercise a healthy level of superiority over their patient by ensuring the best decision
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is being made while still weighing the pros and cons associated with the patient's wishes against
the tenet of “do no unnecessary, avoidable harm.” Teaching a revised curriculum of ethics will
reduce the effects of these potentially dangerous dilemmas.
Studies of medical students have sought to understand the medical ethics education
curriculum, whether the learning outcomes are met, and how the students are dealing with and
reflecting upon certain dilemmas. It has been shown that professionalism was the most
frequently emphasized solution to the problems presented in these situations, as opposed to
communication with the patient (Johnston, Mok 2015:857). This was predominantly observed
through study and discussion with individuals who have experienced the healthcare system. The
development of professional character in medical students is obviously important and is
emphasized in medical education. A professional has a unique set of skills and knowledge in
relation to certain responsibilities that he or she has with the public. The components of this
definition are parallel to the duties and obligations which a physician has with the public and his
or her patients (Stern 2000:26). There exists, however, a difference between an expert and a
professional: a professional has a contract negotiated with a specific group of professionals and
society, whereas an expert has no such contract and simply has knowledge of certain skills and
information.
Professionalism and the values associated with it are heavily influenced by the
socialization process that occurs during the clinical portion of medical school. Therefore, the
ethics which are taught by medical schools are subjective and dependent on the ethics and values
of their teachers and advisors; it is done in a role-modeling type of way, as in “‘Do whatever you
think is right, but if you want to survive in this world you’d better be like me.’” (Stern 2000:27).
!15

This is a major problem in current models of ethics education because it causes the physician to
potentially make improper decisions regarding ethical dilemmas and make choices which satisfy
the autonomy of the attending physician rather than ones which are in the best interest of the
patient’s autonomy and interest. A physician has been quoted as saying:
I once naively expected values to be taught through simple and single expressions of
values: ‘Honesty is the best policy,’ or ‘primum non nocere — above all do no harm.’
But in studying the teaching of professional values, it has been observed that values are
more frequently taught as conflicts, as complex dilemmas between two or more
sometimes equally worthy values (Stern 2000:28).
The only way to solve these problems presented is to overhaul and revise current ethics
education in order to ultimately allow conflicts of conscience to be addressed in a rational way.
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Chapter 3: Ethics Training of Medical Students and Consequences
Medical school is a unique experience which comes with many challenges. Students are
expected to dedicate their entire lives to learning everything there is to know about the human
body, down to minute detail. Most students achieve this, though not without failing to become
educated in other crucial aspects of medical training, such as ethics learning, connecting with
patients, thinking abstractly, and improving methods of communicating -- a fault at the hands of
medical educators. This is not the fault of medical students, though — medical schools seriously
neglect to adequately teach ethics to medical students and residents. Medical schools usually
adhere to one of two styles of teaching ethics: ethics-as-virtue, and ethics-as-character
(Olufowote 2015:256-257). Ethics-as-character encourages physicians to view themselves as
virtuous actors which can do no harm if they make the decision which seems best to them,
encouraging paternalism within the medical community. Ethics-as-virtue, on the other hand,
teaches ethics on a case-by-case basis, challenging medical students to consider cases presented
to them and make the ethically correct decision, whatever that may be. I argue that neither of
these is an entirely acceptable way of teaching ethics in medical schools.
Furthermore, the training of ethics used in medical schools should be changed because of
the paternalism it perpetuates. Physicians either take on a high level of paternalism in their
decision-making on behalf of the patients, or, in an uncertain situation, they will direct all
decision-making to the patient (Olufowote, 2015, 256). Physicians and medical schools should
change ethics training of students and adopt a new approach towards medical ethics education
and implementation if we wish to solve this problem and allow autonomy to play a greater role
in physician-patient interaction.
!17

Teaching detached concern to medical students has been a recurring theme across schools
who use the ethics-as-virtue education approach, and the early sociological works emerging in
the 1970s have focused largely on emotions, emotional socialization and empathy in medical
training and schools (Underman, Hirshfield 2016:94). There have been major shifts within the
medical community since the mid-1990s regarding medical education, and the study of emotions
since then has been relatively non-existent (Underman, Hirshfield 2016:96). An emphasis on
emotion in medical education should be made in order to accommodate the increased diversity of
students, with a focus on gender and racial differences in relation to emotion, differences in selfreported empathy among specialties, and loss of empathy during clinical education (Underman,
Hirshfield 2016:97). By allowing medical students and physicians to openly express emotion,
many of the pressures that are felt during medical school -- feelings of not fitting in, being an
outsider, being inadequate, and being perceived as incompetent -- will be alleviated because of
the open communication that is allowed, benefitting additionally from the implementation of the
interpretive model of physician-patient interaction and in turn a more open expression of
autonomy.
The utility of ethics education will also increase if there is free communication between
physician and patient because it will result in a deeper understanding of the obligations the
patient feels to herself, her family, and other factors, as well as the obligations that the physician
holds to the patient and the medical community. Allowing for emotional expression will increase
bonds between physicians and patients because it brings the doctor down to a more human level.
The clinical environment is currently cold and detached, as medical students are taught to not
form close personal bonds with their patients, emotional or otherwise. This has negative
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repercussions because patients might feel that they are inferior to their physicians or feel that
they cannot engage in a non-judgemental conversation with their doctors. By encouraging
physicians to adopt a humanistic approach to medicine and their interactions, these consequences
can be avoided. Unfortunately, because physicians should become accustomed to delivering
negative diagnoses and information, they have become even more detached. Since young,
inexperienced physicians learn behavioral norms through observing more experienced physicians
-- ethics-as-virtue education --, they adopt this behavior and the detachedness associated with it,
resulting in physicians treating their patients in a callous and detached way. This may have
implications such as physicians acting unsympathetically and making personal decisions on the
behalf of the patient (Ratzan 2014). For example, a physician who has become accustomed to
delivering bad news might tell a patient’s family that their loved one has been diagnosed with a
terminal illness in a way that the physician perceives as professional and detached, but that the
patient perceives as heartless and uncaring. If physicians are encouraged to take an interpretive
approach to models of interaction, then the patient will be considered as a whole sum of their
parts, and the physician will accordingly deliver news to the patient and their family in a way
that they feel will be accepted.
Furthermore, the demographics of medical students coupled with patient health
movements such as desire for involvement in medical decision-making and institutional factors
such as training and educational structure have changed, resulting in a need of revival of ethics
education in medical schools in order to accommodate the diversity of medicine as a whole -- not
just of the patients. Demographics of students have changed, with women and whites each
making up almost half, Asians making almost a quarter, black students making about 6%,
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Latinos making 4%, and multiethnic people making almost a tenth of all medical school
enrollees as of 2014 -- a major difference from the demographics of this population observed in
the 70s (Underman, Hirshfield 2016:96). The diversity implies that ethics-as-character
education, which teaches ethics on a case-by-case basis, is too limited and might not give
physicians a diverse view of differents scenarios and thus should not be used to taught ethics.
Additionally, using ethics-as-virtue, while helpful in encouraging physician self-awareness, will
encourage unreasonable levels of paternalism in the medical community as it causes doctors to
only consider their conception of themselves as a virtuous physician in relation to their actions
and medical decisions. Physicians can become callous because of the paternal nature of clinical
education in addition to the pressures of the medical realm. These norms and their impacts add
to the theme of ever-increasing detachment which can be broken through by using an interpretive
model of interaction bolstered by an obligation-based framework of medical ethical decisionmaking that respects patient and physician autonomy.
The current methods of teaching ethics neglect to provide resources and skills which are
necessary to deal with systemic issues which cause conflicting interests among physicians and
residents (Olufowote 2015:259). Medical students in their residency are usually the primary
caretakers within the hospital, as they provide around-the-clock care and often make treatment
decisions by themselves despite their constant supervision. This paradox arises out of
insecurities held by residents; they are stretched incredibly thin and feel a pressure to have all of
the knowledge of the attending physician without any of the same experience. In an attempt to
not seem inferior or uneducated, residents might make uninformed decisions or choices that they
are not entirely confident in. Therefore, when certain circumstances regarding controversial care
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arise, residents are put into a position in which they do not have sufficient experience due to
either ethics-as-character or ethics-as-virtue education models, potentially leading to
misunderstandings and an inability to ensure autonomous decision-making on the part of the
patient (Olufowote 2015:263). For example, because of the inherently unique and demanding
nature of residency combined with lack of training and supervision, residents sometimes fail to
meet the needs of patients in need of care because they misunderstand their wants, disagree with
patient wishes and make decisions that are in their own best interest, and feel unable to rid
themselves of other pressures which arise as systemic issues in the healthcare system including
the threat of malpractice lawsuits, administrative burdens, and need to retain autonomy -- which
should take priority.
The need for autonomy takes precedence over other needs because it allows for a novel
approach of ethics to be assumed; the duty for a physician to do good for her patient, ultimately
achieving patient autonomy, is her primary duty, which should be aimed at through all action and
use of an interpretive model of interaction. The physician community is required to balance all
of these tensions, plus other, external forces, potentially causing them to make decisions which
ultimately belong to the patient as a part of their autonomy. These external forces can come in
the form of legal repercussions and financial burdens. It is no secret that malpractice litigation is
a lucrative business, and physicians are subject to the threat of lawsuits everyday. This puts huge
amounts of pressure and stress on the practicing physician who should be confident that his
decisions and treatments provided for the patient are approved by the patient herself.
Additionally, there are administrative forces that are at work in the medical community:
providing certain treatments cost more and are more time-consuming to others, and physicians
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might feel pressured to offer one service over the other in order to satisfy these pressures,
although there might be a more effective treatment available to the patient. Ultimately, these
conflicts can lead to the neglect of a physician to honor the patient’s wishes. An interpretive
approach to patient-physician interaction allows physicians to achieve these goals by taking the
patient’s background and morals into consideration. An individual’s conception of the good is of
utmost importance, and a physician who values these ideas is doing the community a favor by
fighting back against these institutional pressures which makes providing adequate, reasonably
paternalistic care for the fully autonomous patient so difficult to do. In order for a physician to
fully understand her patient’s conception of the good, it is crucial that the two parties be able to
interact effectively and communicate openly, necessitating a critical review of doctor-patient
models.
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Chapter 4: Doctor-Patient Models
The doctor-patient relationship is the one which underlies all of this discussion
surrounding the education of ethics in medical schools; this is the relationship which faces the
highest risk of being damaged if an ethical dilemma is handled incorrectly (Wilk, Platt 2016:76).
As has been stated before, historically, physicians have acted in very paternalistic ways:
physicians did not inform patients and arrogated all decision-making authority unto themselves
(McCullough 2011:67). This paternalism deprofessionalizes medical ethics and the institution of
medicine, tarnishing the mutual relationship of trust and respect for autonomy. The foundation
of bioethics, one which is founded in paternalism, is one which we should abandon because it
denies the fiduciary relationship -- providing the highest standard of care -- between physician
and patient and lacks trust by emphasizing paternalism (McCullough 2011:74). In studies which
addressed physician and patient autonomy in decision-making and setting healthcare boundaries
amongst competing values through interviews and surveys that questioned how to ideally handle
hypothetical medical situations, most patient participants believed that the patient and the
physician should have collaborative autonomy and control over the decisions made in a medical
environment regarding intervention and treatment plans (Maurer et al 2017: 591). Additionally,
patients expressed desire to have their wants and desires acknowledged, but still gave ultimate
decision-making power to the physicians after collaboration -- showing that a physician is
expected to exercise a moderate level of paternalism.
There is a social contract which exists between physicians and society that requires these
physicians to perform services for the members of society. Knowing that the patients would,
firstly, be able to trust that their physicians were making the best decisions while still taking into
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account the patients’ autonomy and, secondly, be held morally and, perhaps more concretely,
legally accountable for these decisions, improved interactions and overall faith in this social
contract. These factors fostered the essential sense of trust and respect for physicians and the
medical community as a whole. It was of utmost importance to many patients that there was fair
collaboration -- with all professional duties being fulfilled -- and problem-solving between
between physician and patient, leading to many of these participants agreeing that policies
should protect the medical, autonomous, and conscientious wellbeing of the public through
improved models of doctor-patient interaction and better understanding of possible courses of
action and policies.
While it has been proven that patients are willing to give physicians a moderate level of
control in the form of paternalistic actions, is imperative that patients be more involved in the
medical decision-making process. There are currently four models of patient-physician
interaction that have been posited: the paternalistic model, the interpretive model, the
informative model, and the deliberative model. (Emanuel et al., 1992:2221). Recently, there has
been a shift towards the informative model, which does not restrict patient independence and
autonomy to the degree of the other three models (Emanuel et al., 1992:2221). There is a unique
relationship that exists between patients and physicians; it is true that the patient should retain his
autonomy and be able to make decisions about treatment that he feels are acceptable, but it is
also important to still respect the judgmental capacities and knowledge of the physician. There
has been much discussion recently about whether there should be a greater amount of patient
control, and if so, if it would cause an imbalance in judgement of wants due to the sick patient’s
desire for security without regard for correct interpretation and understanding of medical
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information (Emanuel et al., 1992:2222)? In order to make an informed recommendation for
future physician-patient models, it is important to discuss those that have been used in the past.
First, the paternalistic model, also referred to as the parental model or the priestly
model, refers to the interaction between patient and physician in which the patient is given care
that best promotes his health, according to the judgements of the physician (Emanuel et al.,
1992:2222). In this model, there is the assumption that there are shared beliefs between
physician and patient about what is the best end for the patient, and the physicians can then
diagnose, provide treatment options, and encourage the patient to agree to the treatment that the
physician deems most useful (Emanuel et al., 1992:2222). This model has been encouraged
historically within the medical realm. Physicians have been viewed as the ultimate decisionmakers in practice as they were regarded as more knowledgeable in practical medicine and also
in the best interests of the patient. The paternalistic model allows the physician to act as the
patient’s guardian and obtains consent through guiding and convincing the patient to accept the
intervention of the physician -- a relationship which has been actively moved away from in
recent years due to the complete lack of patient autonomy that this model perpetuates.
Second, the informative model is also known as the scientific, engineering, or
consumer model, and refers to the relationship between a physician and patient in which the
physician diagnosis the patient, provides all possible treatment options and relevant information,
and then allows the patient to choose the option that best realizes her values and goals (Emanuel
et al., 1992:2223). This model assumes that the patient has a clear conception and understanding
of their values but is lacking the facts necessary to make a well-informed decision. The
physician’s role is to provide the facts so the patient can express autonomy through complete
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control over medical decision making (Emanuel et al., 1992:2223). This model moves closer to
the ideal patient-physician relationship, but gives too much responsibility to the patient. The
medical realm is unique in that there is a necessary but moderate level of paternalism that should
be exercised by the physician in order to ensure the physical well-being of the patient. If the
patient is given entire decision-making capability, then there might be certain potential medical
outcomes that are neglected because of the patient’s lack of medical understanding and training.
The interpretive model is slightly similar to the informative model, but instead aims at
bringing the patient’s values to light and helping the patient decide which medical intervention is
in keeping with his actual wishes (Emanuel et al., 1992:2222). The physician adhering to the
interpretive model goes beyond that of the informative model because she helps the patient to
articulate his assumedly unknown and unfixed values. In this model, the physician is analogous
to a counselor who does not impart judgement or personal biases, but instead refers to the
patient’s life as an entire narrative and then helps the patient come to recognize and understand
his morals and goals in order to make the decision which is best for the patient himself (Emanuel
et al., 1992:2222). The physician will then provide treatment options that are in line with the
patient’s morals and aid the patient in choosing his preferred treatment plan without the use of
persuasion, resulting in an ideal combination of paternalism on behalf of the physician with
respect for patient autonomy.
The last model is known as the deliberative model, which aims to help the patient
realize the best health-related values that can be achieved in the medical situation (Emanuel et
al., 1992:2222). The physician, differing from that of the interpretive model, only discusses that
which is directly health-related and relevant, purposefully neglecting to consider any other non!26

health-related factors. The physician can persuade the patient to make a certain decision, but
should avoid coercion (Emanuel et al., 1992:2222). For example, the physician may tell his
patient that in his professional opinion, he advises that his patient takes Action A, but should not
tell his patient that he should or should take Action A, or say that if he, himself, where in the
same position as his patient, that he would take Action A. This model seriously lacks in that it
does not consider the patient a rational, whole being; it neglects to consider the entire narrative
of a patient’s life and potential non-medical factors that could affect the patient. Instead, the
deliberative model takes a narrow approach and only considers elements which are directly
related to the medical aspects of the situation.
While each of these four models have useful and relevant justifications and intentions
behind potential use, it is obvious that in allowing for greater patient autonomy, it is imperative
to adopt the interpretive model as the norm for most patient-physician interactions. The patient
should not be viewed as an end in himself as strictly a medical problem that should be taken care
of with no other consideration of autonomy or personal identity, and should instead be allowed to
make decisions that keep with his entire life narrative, taking into consideration morals held
outside of the realm of medicine, including personal, spiritual, or otherwise. The interpretive
model allows for true consent and expression of autonomy, as the patient can “evaluate
knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each” in relation to their values
(Emanuel et al., 1992:2222). Furthermore, moving away from the paternalistic model and
shifting towards the interpretive model allows for more open and honest communication of these
values and opinions for both parties, allowing for conscientious objection to be discussed openly,
objectively, and without judgement.
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Chapter 5: Conscientious Objection
The Church amendment is a legal provision which has set up conscientious objection in
healthcare and has laid the framework for future discussions of conscientious objection. The
Church amendment allows healthcare providers to object to providing treatments “on the basis of
moral beliefs or religious convictions.” The specific language used in this amendment directly
allows providers to object to providing services such as sterilization and abortion based on moral
convictions. The amendment is as follows:
The receipt of any grant, contract, loan, or loan guarantee under the Public Health Service
Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.], the Community Mental Health Centers Act [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2689 et seq.], or the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction
Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6000 et seq.] by any individual or entity does not authorize any court
or any public official or other public authority to require-(1) such individual to perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization procedure
or abortion if his performance or assistance in the performance of such procedure or
abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions; or
(2) such entity to-(A) make its facilities available for the performance of any sterilization procedure or
abortion if the performance of such procedure or abortion in such facilities is prohibited
by the entity on the basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions, or
(B) provide any personnel for the performance or assistance in the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if the performance or assistance in the performance of
such procedures or abortion by such personnel would be contrary to the religious beliefs
or moral convictions of such personnel.
This is a legal document which makes it legal for healthcare providers to object to performing
services such as abortions and sterilizations based on personal or religious morals. The
amendment also prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals who refuse to
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provide certain treatments “on the grounds that his performance or assistance in the performance
of the procedure or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral
convictions” (Church amendment). This amendment has importance and implications in the
legality and acceptability of conscientious objection in healthcare today.
Conscientious objection has historically been associated with refusal to comply with
mandatory military enlistment. More recently, in the 1960s and 70s, conscientious objection has
been seen in the healthcare field with doctors beginning to refuse to administer abortions or aid
in patient death (Wester 2015:427). This has led to the commonly accepted definition of
‘conscientious objection’ in healthcare to refer to the ability of health care professionals to refuse
the administration of certain drugs, procedures, and other services within his or her skill set and
competence level on the basis of violating his or her set of moral or religious guidelines
(Wicclair 2011:1). The major question that arises out of this issue is whether or not we should
allow for these objections, and if so, how? Conscientious objection creates a conflict of interest
between those of the health care provider as an autonomous, moral agent, and those of the patient
who has a right to receive care free of judgement.
Wicclair defines conscientious objection as
In the context of health care, physicians, nurses and pharmacists engage in acts of
conscientious objection when they: (1) refuse to provide legal and professionally
accepted goods or services that fall within the scope of their professional competence,
and (2) justify their refusal by claiming that it is an act of conscience or it is consciencebased (Wicclair 2011:1).
Conscientious objection involves one’s beliefs — either secular or religious — about what is
right or wrong. In refusing certain services based on these grounds, the health care professional
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should then provide an explanation for his or her reasoning behind refusing the good or service.
Objections made on the basis of moral and ethical beliefs are distinct from those made on the
basis of self-interest, safety, or financial gains. Refusals of the latter type do not fall under
conscientious objection, as these types of objections are based on beliefs which are central to our
identity.
There have been multiple different definitions of conscientious objection provided. The
permissibility of conscientious objection in the world of medicine is a more encompassing issue
that is related to many different types of dilemmas that occur between physicians and patients,
explaining these differences in definitions. Similarly to issues regarding providing physician
assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia, physicians sometimes struggle with whether or not it is
moral to refuse providing certain treatments that are within their capabilities on a personal ethical
basis (Rasinski 2011:11). Conscientious objection is permissible in situations in which there is
no general consensus about the morality of performing a certain action, such as abortion or
physician assisted suicide (Wicclair 2000:206). In these scenarios, the controversy that arises
suggests that tolerance and allowance for conscientious objection are necessary (Wicclair
2000:207). Wicclair restricts his definition of conscientious objection by narrowing acceptable
objections to be based off of personal moral beliefs, not including professional values (Wester
2015:428). This means that concerns about the necessity of the procedure, the risks involved, or
what is best for the patient, should not be involved in decisions regarding conscientious
objection. Lynch, on the other hand, provides a different notion of conscientious objection. She
identifies her definition, which allows strictly professional medical norms such as do no
unnecessary harm and respect autonomy to be the foundation of conscience-based refusals, as a
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type of ethical orientation (Wester 2015:428). As the healthcare profession is so unique in its
characteristics, it should allow for the professional’s personal values to be included in their
practice, to a point.
Past arguments have stated that conscientious objection is most strongly supported by
the rationale of moral integrity. Most individuals believe holding fundamental beliefs about what
is right and wrong is important, and some might even argue that violating one’s deeply-held
personal beliefs is wrong, leading to deep feelings of shame, regret, and guilt; there is quite a
difference between producing physicians who are walking robots with no moral compass and
producing physicians who are autonomous, moral agents who uphold the responsibility of
medical professionals who have a duty to provide goods and services to their patients. An
additional argument in support of honoring appeals to conscientious objection is formed off of
the basis of the principle state of neutrality; individual’s ideas of what the “good life” is should
all be equally respected, therefore allowing for conscientious objection (Wicclair 2011:2). Mark
Wicclair, a philosopher who supports conscientious objection, argues that there are many reasons
for supporting conscientious objection, but the most compelling centers on maintaining moral
integrity. Wicclair considers moral integrity to be a prima facie duty, as other factors such as
patient wellbeing can override this interest (Wicclair 2017:7). What is so important in Wicclair’s
argument for conscientious objection is that he upholds practicing medicine as a human and
moral enterprise which seeks to protect human values and reduce suffering. Moral dilemmas do
not have a perfect solution that will dissolve all conflict and alleviate all feelings of wrongdoing,
and Wicclair addresses this:
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My objective, however, is not to offer the best philosophical account of moral integrity.
My aim is considerably more limited and practical. I simply want to argue that one
conception of moral integrity…is sound and suitable in the specific context of responding
to health professionals’ conscientious objections and requests for accommodation
(Wicclair 2017:7-8).
Maintaining moral integrity is important because of the direct effect it has on personal integrity
and one’s conception of oneself as a moral character and actor. This in turn will effect one’s
conception as being a virtuous and moral professional, which will allow medicine to be practiced
more effectively by protecting humanistic values.
What is important to remember in all of these scenarios is that the patient most likely
does not want to die or does not want to abort the fetus that could become their child. However,
it is the best choice that they have; it is in their best self-interest. These are not easy decisions to
make and should not be taken lightly, but should be dealt with with respect, compassion, and
knowledge. The same can be said about physicians in their role in these situations. There are a
few reasons suggested for recognizing the permissibility of conscious-based objections: ethical
relativism and toleration of moral diversity. (Wicclair 2000:210-221). These reasons are weak
ones, though, and do not get to the true root of the issue, necessitating other reasonings to be
considered.
Ethical relativism posits that ethical statements have truth only in relation to moral
guidelines and that there are a few different moral guidelines that may clash, but none of which
are superior (Wicclair 2000:210). Using ethical relativism as a reason to support conscientious
objection is a weak one, as it would allow physicians to refuse to provide further treatment or
palliative care for the patient who is terminally ill and refuses life-sustaining therapy based on
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personal morals that contradict with providing treatments, either curative or palliative, for those
who are terminally ill. However, according to guidelines of the British Medical Association, the
American Thoracic Society, and The Hastings Center, there is a valid standard of treatment
which requires physicians to continue to participate in the treatment and palliative process of the
patient even when life-sustaining treatment is refused (Wicclair 2000:210). These guidelines
give a framework which should be consulted when providing care. The main principles of
medicine are respecting patient autonomy, doing no harm, and respect the patient’s conception of
the good, which are laid out in these guidelines. These principles take precedence in medicine,
ultimately destroying the argument of the ethical relativist. Therefore, listing ethical relativism
as a reason to allow conscientious objection is a weak argument.
A second suggestion of reasoning behind conscientious objection is tolerance of moral
diversity; “according to the principle of toleration of moral diversity, we should tolerate the
moral views of others and not attempt to impose our ethical beliefs on them” (Wicclair
2000:211). If this is true, then any physician for any reason would be able to refuse to provide
any treatment to her patient. Additionally, accepting this line of reasoning would require any and
all appeals to morals to be tolerated if we are to respect diversity. This is troubling because there
are obviously standards for providing treatment which are present in the medical culture that take
priority over other morals. These standards include protecting patient autonomy and doing no
harm. While toleration for moral reasoning can be listed as a reason for more contentious actions
such as abortion or physician assisted suicide, it is a weak justification for established norms
such as refusing to honor a patient’s wishes of halting treatment and thus should not be listed as
the reason to allow conscientious objection (Wicclair 2000:211).
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Moral integrity is also cited as a reason to support conscience-based objections. This line
of reasoning requires the acceptance of the following implications about the physician:
“(1) She has core ethical values. (2) These core ethical values are part of her
understanding of who she is…they are integral to her self-conception or identity. (3) It would be
incompatible with those core ethical values to participate in…care” (Wicclair 2000:214).
This reasoning seems to have some merit, as it applies to the physician’s conception of herself as
a moral actor, which is imperative in providing ethical treatment that respects patient autonomy
and conception of the good while doing no harm. This reasoning is still very broad: loss of selfrespect is a rational basis for refusing to treat, but this line of thought can be similarly applied to
other professions such as marketing or advertising (Wicclair 2000:214). It is true that
independent advertisement agencies are generally not allowed to refuse to represent a certain
client that goes against their morals, such as tobacco companies, because of professional
standards and business norms that encourage these agencies to earn revenue and not discriminate
between clients (Wicclair 2000:214). Therefore, there should be a difference between the
medical profession and other professions regarding the permissibility of conscience-based
objections.
The answer to this difference is that medicine is a ‘moral enterprise’:
(1) Physician decision-making should be guided by a consideration of obligations to
patients rather than the physician’s self-interest. (2) Physician decision-making should be
informed by ethical values and professional standards…, and physicians should not act as
mere ‘technicians’ who will perform requested services on demand” (Wicclair 2000:215).
This definition of medicine as a moral enterprise seeks to explain what medicine is about, which
is something that is humanly valuable. Medicine aims at protecting these values, such as
autonomy and wellbeing, ultimately relieving suffering of all forms: mental, physical, spiritual,
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etc. To say that medicine is a moral enterprise is not to say that physicians should be guided
solely by personal values and ethics, but rather that they should adhere to the goals and values of
medicine (Wicclair 2000:216). Because medicine is so unique in nature, goals, and guidelines,
there should be adequate reasoning for recognizing and honoring objections which have
significant moral weight, which is found in medicine being a moral enterprise. Therefore, as
stated by Wicclair, “an appeal to conscience has significant moral weight only if the core ethical
values on which it is based correspond to one or more are values in medicine” (2000:217).
These values include compassion, moral integrity, altruism, trustworthiness, and respect for
autonomy (Wicclair 2000:217). Retaining moral integrity is a rational basis for allowing
physicians to conscientiously object, but it should be used as reasoning in addition to another,
underlying principle in order to explain why moral integrity is crucial.
Autonomy is a necessary function of medicine that allows patients — and physicians —
to play an active role in medical decision making, and is often listed as a reason to allow
conscientious objection. Proponents of this line of thought state that respect for autonomy
applies to patients just as it does to physicians, allowing physicians to refuse providing treatment
if they have objections to it. But there is a limited spectrum of reasoning that physicians can use
to object, and the main principles of medicine should still take priority. Because, ultimately, the
patient has priority over the morals of the physician because of these medical principles,
allowing conscientious objection based on autonomy is a solid reasoning. Because medicine is a
reciprocal institution based on a relationship of respect and trust of both patient and physician, it
is necessary to respect physician autonomy just as we would respect patient autonomy. Because
patients, as stated earlier, always take top priority, then the principles of medicine will be upheld.
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However, in situations where it is possible for a physician to refuse a certain treatment without
infringing upon the rights of the patient, it is permissible to honor these requests. It is important
to remember, though, that there is a difference between respecting autonomy and respecting
conscience (Wicclair 2000:213). It is possible for a physician’s conscience to be respected — if
the physicians withdraws from caring for her patient and refers him to another physician — but
not have her autonomy respected — as when she withdraws from care, she will not have her
moral preferences or autonomy respected in the future treatment of the patient (Wicclair
2000:213). This is where the physician should be comfortable with experiencing a give and take
of morals. Now that it has been shown that conscientious objection may be allowed on the basis
of respect for autonomy, it is important to determine when conscientious objection may occur.
Wicclair has put forth five guidelines for identifying relevant consideration of
conscientious objection. The first states that (1) conscience-based objections have more moral
value and are a more serious consideration when they are based off the physician’s central moral
values (Wicclair 2000:221). Therefore, when performing a certain treatment will cause great
distress to the physician’s core values, the request to object should be considered. This is a
crucial distinction, as it sets a standard for objections. Physicians may not object to performing
services that they simply find controversial or contentious. A physician’s request for objection
will carry much more weight when the values listed as reasoning for objection are core values to
the physician that pose risk to be greatly harmed if the physician is forced to perform a certain
service. In this case, the physician may experience severe and undue suffering, similarly to the
patient who is being denied treatment or forced to receive treatment against his wishes such as in
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the earlier example of the patient being forced to receive a blood transfusion, prioritizing the
need for mutual respect of core values for both patient and physician (Wicclair 2000:221).
The second guideline states that (2) when there are significant differing moral appeals to
conscience from professional norms, there are similar differences in moral weight (Wicclair
2000:222). If there is no largely agreed-upon consensus about the morality or permissibility of
the action, such as with physician assisted suicide, then there should be different moral weight
assigned to each individual’s morals. Acknowledging the subjectivity of morals experienced by
different individuals as a result of external influences such as upbringing, religion, and education
allows these differences to be taken into consideration individually on a case-by-case basis.
Approaching conscience-based objections on the individual level will be incredibly useful as it
will allow only serious, relevant objections to be honored and will take into consideration the
physician’s entire narrative to gauge the values which are most central to their being. However,
there should be caution taken when applying this guideline. If we are to only allow physicians to
object when there is no agreed upon consensus regarding the necessity of providing the
treatment, then it will be difficult for progress and change to be achieved within the medical
community. For example, historically, it was perceived to be permissible to perform exploratory
and experimental surgeries on non-consensual, non-anesthetized members of minority groups.
Consider the case of James Marion Sims, who is known as the Father of Modern Gynecology
(Vedantam, et al. 2016). Sims famously performed experiments on slaves and this practice was
widely accepted. If it had not been for conscientious objectors, this moral evil which had
become a norm would have never been changed. It is important to consider objections on an
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individual basis to not allow norms and consensus to play such a large role in these
considerations in order to allow for progress in medicine (Wicclair 2000:222).
Thirdly, (3) when objections are made based on values that are central to the physician’s
identity as an ethical professional rather than personal ethical conceptions they are given more
weight because medicine has such unique characteristics, requirement, and boundaries that
require physicians to act in accordance with guidelines and norms that are different from any
other community (Wicclair 2000:224). If an objection is made because the physician feels that
providing the treatment would tarnish her reputation as an ethical professional rather than her
reputation as an ethical person, then the objection will carry more weight because it is
considering the entire medical profession and techne overall. An example of this scenario might
be the physician who refuses to provide an abortion for a woman who is carrying a fetus which is
healthy and is progressing normally according to medical guidelines. The physician refuses to
provide the treatment because she feels that she is causing harm to a being by terminating their
life. The physician feels that doing so would tarnish her reputation as an ethical physician
because she feels that providing an abortion is doing harm, thus violating one of the primary
principles of medicine she is required to adhere to. This request for objection would be given
more weight than a similar request by a physician who refuses to provide an abortion based on
personal morals, such as the physician who believes that providing an abortion would personally
tarnish his reputation as a good Christian. This is arguably the most important guideline, as it
directly relates to the professionalism that is so crucial to the medical community. When a
physician feels that her identity as a physician who is upholding the core values and principles of
medicine is being tarnished by performing a certain action, then there is a unique importance to
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that request of objection; it is not simply a personal, small-scale, and potentially subjective
request to abstain, as it has large-scale implications for the reputation of medicine. Giving
serious weight to objections that lie in the individual’s conception of himself as a virtuous,
competent, and effective physician who is upholding the core principles of medicine will allow
medicine to progress and improve over time. This guideline as well as the second guideline
should be combined and refer to each other in order to ensure that the concerns associated with
the second objection are avoided and that medical moral advancements are made.
The fourth guideline put forth by Wicclair states (4) the rights and values of the patient
should avoid being compromised at all costs (2000:225). Therefore, it is best for patients to lay
out their wishes in advance, but regardless, physicians should honor these requests in a
respectful, non-judgmental manner, such as referring the patient to another doctor. Because of
the primary principles of medicine it is crucial that physicians honor these and ultimately act in
the best interest of the patient. Being a physician carries unique professional obligations, and
while equally honoring physician morals would happen in an ideal medical setting, it is
important, as a professional, to primarily respect the patient’s wishes.
Lastly, (5) different individuals assign different moral weight to certain virtues, making it
necessary for recognized rights to guide the deliberation process of whether to honor a request to
object from providing treatment (Wicclair 2000:226). Because there is no way to assign worth to
these values, it is a subjective process, but should be considered on a case-by-case basis referring
to recognized professional norms (Wicclair 2000:227). In these considerations, though, it is
important to allow medical principles such as the principles to guide subjectivity and assignment
of weight to individual morals. There is a need for refinement in the consideration of
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conscience-based objections in medicine, which takes a more nuanced approach on a case-bycase basis.
I accept this argument and these guidelines, but also suggest a sixth clause which
works in tandem with Wicclair’s fourth guideline: a requested accommodation will only be
honored if it will not inflict extreme physical, mental, or spiritual pain on the patient. One might
question why mental and spiritual pain are of such importance in the practicing of medicine. It is
because some individuals give great weight to the religious and spiritual forces in their life. The
mental and spiritual suffering brought on by being forced to abstain from, or even receive, a
certain treatment may be far worse than the pain experienced by the physician who does not wish
to provide it. Consider the patient who is opposed to receiving a blood transfusion for religious
reasons who is being cared for by a physician who requests to refuse to honor the patient’s
abstaining from receiving this transfusion. If the physician ignores the patient’s request, does not
listen to his reasoning, and administers the transfusion anyway, then the patient may experience
intense spiritual or religious suffering. This suffering may be brought on in that the patient feels
that he will be going to hell and have committed an unforgivable sin in receiving this transfusion.
This experience of religious suffering may be worse than that experienced by the physician who
feels that it would be irrational to not provide the blood transfusion. This is a necessary
stipulation that should be made because of the importance of the patient’s and the physician’s
conception of the good and their autonomy. If this factor is not considered, then the levels of
paternalism within the medical community will reach astronomical and dangerous levels.
There is a thin line between respecting the physician’s morals in conjunction with the
patient’s morals and the duties that the physician holds, and with inciting high levels of
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paternalism to the detriment of the medical field (Wicclair 2014:269). It has been said that
within the medical field it is the morals of the physician versus the morals of the patient (Huddle
2017:429). While this may be true to a point, there is a way to mediate this in a rule-based and
obligation-centered environment which is reinforced through ethics training within medical
school. These five requirements allow physicians to maintain moral integrity while still
remaining responsible for their duties that they hold to their patients. There will still be
situations, though, in which physicians will not have their conscience fully honored. This
discussion of scenarios in which conscientious objection would be permissible and certain
specific scenarios in which there might be a conflict of morals or conscience has led up to this
ultimate concluding point which is important to make. It is important to not list these scenarios
as problems which should be given a concrete solution to, but rather as moral dilemmas we
should provide a comprehensive exposition of. Again, medicine is a moral enterprise which aims
at protecting human values and reducing suffering. There is no one correct, fool-proof action to
take in these situations, but it is imperative that we consider what is at stake: the suffering of a
patient and the infringement upon physician conscience and autonomy. Because a primary
principle of medicine is to act for the good of the patient, the alleviation and prevention of
patient suffering should take utmost priority. In these specific examples of conflicts of
conscience that have been provided, there has been no one way to deal with them. Therefore,
each case should be considered on an individual basis in relation to Wicclair’s guidelines,
alleviation of suffering, and protection of humanistic values.
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Chapter 6: ‘Give and Take’: Two Case Studies
There is a certain give and take regarding conscience which physicians should subject
themselves to as a necessary part of being a medical professional. Even when a physician’s
request for conscientious objection is honored, her autonomy is retained but her conscience is
still subject to conflicts. There are some morals one holds as a result of upbringing, including,
but not limited to family and religious influences, which can be explained by culture and
surroundings. There are also morals imposed onto physicians by the medical community, as seen
within the universal medical principles regarding respecting patient autonomy and doing no
harm. These morals may come into conflict with the duties that the physician holds to his
patients. In certain scenarios, the conflicting morals of the physician may also conflict with the
patient’s wishes. Take for example a patient who is rapidly hemorrhaging and requires a blood
transfusion, but who refuses the blood transfusion on the basis of religious principles. The
patient feels an imperative obligation to refuse the blood transfusion because it goes against his
morals, although the consequence of doing so may be death. The wish of the patient most likely
conflicts with the physician’s moral duty, which is to heal and treat the patient and to always do
good for the patient.
This is where current medical ethics fails to resolve the issue at hand, necessitating the
need to refer back to patient autonomy and consider which medical principle takes precedence in
this situation. In being a moral physician, a doctor should respect patient autonomy, do good by
the patient, and to heal. However, because of one’s own personally-held beliefs or moral
obligations, the physician may have a unique idea of what those concepts -- such as ‘doing good’
and ‘doing no harm’ -- entail. For example, one physician may believe that doing good for the
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patient is providing palliative care when a patient is given a terminal diagnosis, while another
physician may conceptualize the good as providing curative treatments until death for a patient
with a terminal diagnosis. However, the physician should refrain from wholly imparting his own
beliefs about what is good or moral onto his patients and understand what the core of those
medical principles is. Referring back to the case when the physician’s conception of the good
differs from that of the patient regarding a blood transfusion, the physician should acknowledge
that the patient is a rational being, and respect her autonomous wishes to abstain from receiving a
blood transfusion. The physician may ask the patient if other interventions are acceptable, but
should ultimately respect the patient’s wishes and not administer a blood transfusion. This
decision should be made because of the patient’s status as a rational, consenting, and wellinformed adult who is aware of all of the risks and benefits associated with receiving or
abstaining from a medical intervention.
The physician used considerations of differing personal virtues and weighing the
importance of certain morals in this conflictual dilemma to revisit his core duties and obligations
which he has to his patient as a doctor, and then correctly made a decision referring back to
humanitarian principles in order to effectively practice medicine. It is important to acknowledge
that in honoring the patient’s wishes and conception of the good that the physician was forced to
act in a way which violated his morals. The physician, whose conception of the good includes
administering a blood transfusion to rational adults in order to sustain life, acted in accordance
with the wishes of the patient in order to uphold the principles of the medical community.
Ultimately, the physician experienced ‘give and take’ of morals, as he was required to sacrifice
some of his morals for the good and autonomy of the patient.
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This discussion of ethics and morality has led up to identifying the central issue
underlying many medical dilemmas, and is especially useful in today’s political climate and
dealing with the ramifications that it has caused in the medical arena. In every situation where
there is a conflict of interests, it is the physician’s duty to ultimately, at the base of all ethics,
consider the harm and suffering that their patient will experience depending on which course of
action is taken, as it is a core principle of ethics to treat the patient. Doing harm can include
malpractice in the technical sense, but also by acting overly paternalistically and by making
decisions on the behalf of the patient that conflict with his or her conception of the good and
autonomy. Unfortunately, there are many situations in which all possible courses of action will
cause at least some suffering, such as in the case of the terminal patient who wishes to sustain
curative treatment until death despite the physician’s idea that palliative care should be
administered to ensure the most comfortable, yet inevitable, death. The suffering here is felt by
the physician who is forced to sustain life at all costs despite the potential physical toll it might
take on the patient, and is felt by the patient who is ultimately dying and who has a small chance
of survival despite the interventions she is being subjected to. It is a physician’s duty to weigh
on all levels -- mental, spiritual, religious, and physical -- which action will cause the least
infringement of patient’s rights. The moral plan of action to take is the one where the least
amount of suffering is experienced by the patient.
As has been discussed earlier, there is a healthy and necessary level of paternalism in the
medical community. Physicians, as social actors, are required to make decisions in the best
interest of their patients, for their patients. This entails respecting physical, mental, emotional,
and spiritual manifestations of the patient’s conception of the good -- a narrow-minded approach
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cannot be taken when effectively practicing medicine. While this is an idyllic view of how
medicine should be practiced, physicians are under pressure from institutional and personal
moral forces, leading to other factors influencing decision-making such as finances,
administration, and potential legal action. Because physicians are expected to act as morally
virtuous, responsible persons and be aware of the unique set of skills and knowledge they have
been imparted, they begin to allow paternalism to infiltrate their practice.
Paternalism is a term used to address one’s acting in strict accordance with one’s own
wishes, best interests, and notions of the good on the behalf of another (Debeljak et al.,
2008:217). This definition is uniquely related to this discussion of ethics because of the risk of a
physician unknowingly making treatment decisions on behalf of his patients that are in
accordance with the physician’s morals but conflict with those of the patient, or to provide a
certain treatment only to avoid negative repercussions associated with external factors such as
cost and legal action. For example, a physician may neglect to make a patient aware of a certain
treatment option available to them because the physician perceives the treatment not to be cost
efficient, or because the physician is hesitant to provide a treatment based on the riskiness of the
procedure and the physician’s caution in avoiding malpractice lawsuits. To say that physicians,
on average, act with paternalistic tendencies is not an attack on the character of those who
become physicians; in fact, it is an attack on the institution and culture of the healthcare and
medical fields over all. Physicians should not live in constant trepidation that their actions may
be the wrong one, thus causing them to face legal and moral repercussions. Additionally, this
paternalism is not entirely selfish, which is defined as self-interest, which excludes the
consideration of others. The physician considers himself, his patients, and other factors, though
!45

he may not give enough moral weight to the wants and needs of the patient, as discussed before
(Debeljak et al., 2008:218). Rather, physicians participate in a type of “enlightened”
paternalism, which considers the patient and other factors. This approach is still morally wrong
because the physician uses these other actors (patients) as a mere means to the physician’s end,
which is avoidance of moral and legal repercussions, ultimately neglecting to fully honor the
patient’s autonomy (Debeljak et al., 2008:218). In this case, the physician is only honoring his
needs and morals and neglects to honor those of the patient, resulting in disproportionate value
being placed on the autonomy of the physicians within the medical realm.
It still may not be obvious how a physician’s obligations to the medical field may force
them to act in a paternalistic way. Consider the following: a physician has duties to his patient to
treat efficiently and effectively, and respect patient autonomy. A physician also has duties to the
medical field and the institution to which she belongs to including upholding the honor of the
medical community, treating in a moral way, and doing no harm through perceived recklessness,
endangerment, or ignorance. Because a physician may face serious punishment inflicted by the
medical field for failure to fulfill these obligations such as being sued by patients, imparting false
knowledge, or acting in a negligent way, she feels that her actions are being scrutinized and so
act in a way which protects herself and keeps her best interests at heart. For example, a
physician may make decisions on the behalf of her patients that are not congruent with the
patient’s wishes, but protect the self-interests of the physician. By doing so, the physicians are
acting in accordance with paternalism. In these scenarios, the physician is allowing factors that
are extraneous to the goals of humanistic medicine to infiltrate the practice of medicine. While
these pressures are still important in the avoidance of lawsuits and in using resources adequately,
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they should not enter the doctor’s judgements of what treatments to provide to his patients in
order to prevent suffering.
Paternalism also refers to a physician subordinating the patient because he thinks that it is
in the best interest of the patient. Paternalism, in moderation, is a necessary function of
medicine; physicians should be able to assess whether a patient is a rational agent with rational
wishes, and if he is irrational, be able to make decisions that are in his best interest. However,
because of the idea that physicians are always virtuous, all-knowing agents, doctors can
sometimes exercise high levels of paternalism. Physicians may subordinate their patients to the
point of neglecting the patient’s wishes and conception of a good end and give options and
provide treatments that the doctors themselves believe to be the best option, disregarding the
beliefs of the patient. This may be done unconsciously, as is the case with egoism within the
medical community. It is not rational to say that physicians intentionally act in an egoistic or
paternalistic way; it is, however, quite reasonable to attribute the high prevalence of these actions
to the inadequacy of medical training and professional ideals of physicians that is a consequence
of being an actor within the medical field.
There are serious ramifications that exist as a result of these actions; physicians are illequipped to ethically deal with medical dilemmas that arise. During the limited medical training
that physicians receive, they are provided with the same cases over and over again to learn what
to do in a uniquely challenging situation. Medical students, at the end of this training, know how
to deal with a patient who refuses a blood transfusion on a religious basis, or a patient who
wishes to end his own life before a terminal illness takes it from them -- both of which we will
further analyze -- but rarely understand the ethical principles that lay at the core of these
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problems. I argue that there is a unique ethical evaluative process that should occur in order for
physicians to be able to solve these problems and allow physicians to interact with their patients,
ultimately experiencing a give and take of morals in the medical setting. Two small-scale case
studies will be completed in order to critically analyze objectors of specific procedures:
physician assisted suicide/euthanasia and abortion.

Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia
Guidelines have been put in place by Oregon to allow physicians to assist patients in
committing suicide. These guidelines are known as the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. The
components of the act set limitations for those who wish to initiate a request for life-ending
medication and for the physician who is fulfilling the request. One may request this medication
if one is:
(1) An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the
attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and
who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for
medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner in
accordance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897.
An adult is defined, within this context, as an individual who is 18 years or older, and the
attending physician is the physician who is primarily responsible for the adult’s care and
treatment of his disease. The physician also has duties to his patient during this period:
(1) The attending physician shall:
(a) Make the initial determination of whether a patient has a terminal disease, is capable,
and has made the request voluntarily;
(b) Request that the patient demonstrate Oregon residency pursuant to ORS 127.860; (c)
To ensure that the patient is making an informed decision, inform the patient of: (A) His
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or her medical diagnosis;
(B) His or her prognosis;
(C) The potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed; (D) The
probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed; and
(E) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care and
pain control;
(d) Refer the patient to a consulting physician for medical confirmation of the diagnosis,
and for a determination that the patient is capable and acting voluntarily;
(e) Refer the patient for counseling if appropriate pursuant to ORS 127.825; (f)
Recommend that the patient notify next of kin;
(g) Counsel the patient about the importance of having another person present when the
patient takes the medication prescribed pursuant to ORS 127.800 to 127.897 and of not
taking the medication in a public place;
(h) Inform the patient that he or she has an opportunity to rescind the request at any time
and in any manner, and offer the patient an opportunity to rescind at the end of the 15 day
waiting period pursuant to ORS 127.840;
(i) Verify, immediately prior to writing the prescription for medication under ORS
127.800 to 127.897, that the patient is making an informed decision;
(j) Fulfill the medical record documentation requirements of ORS 127.855;
(k) Ensure that all appropriate steps are carried out in accordance with ORS 127.800 to
127.897 prior to writing a prescription for medication to enable a qualified patient to end
his or her life in a humane and dignified manner; and
(L)(A) Dispense medications directly, including ancillary medications intended to
facilitate the desired effect to minimize the patient’s discomfort, provided the attending
physician is registered as a dispensing physician with the Board of Medical Examiners,
has a current Drug Enforcement Administration certificate and complies with any
applicable administrative rule; or
(B) With the patient’s written consent:
(i) Contact a pharmacist and inform the pharmacist of the prescription; and
(ii) Deliver the written prescription personally or by mail to the pharmacist, who will
dispense the medications to either the patient, the attending physician or an expressly
identified agent of the patient.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the attending physician may sign the
patient’s death certificate. [1995 c.3 §3.01; 1999 c.423 §3]
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These limitations provide reasonable guidelines in order to protect the patient from external
sources of coercion, as well as to make sure the patient is aware of all other treatment options,
his prognosis, and the steps which the patient must take in order to receive assisted suicide. The
patient must make an oral request to his physician for this service as well as submit a written
request. The patient then is required to make a second oral request to his physician no less than
fifteen days after making the initial oral request (127.840 §3.06). The form of the written request
is also subject to certain criteria:
(1) A valid request for medication under ORS 127.800 to 127.897 shall be in substantially
the form described in ORS 127.897, signed and dated by the patient and witnessed by at
least two individuals who, in the presence of the patient, attest that to the best of their
knowledge and belief the patient is capable, acting voluntarily, and is not being coerced
to sign the request.
(2) One of the witnesses shall be a person who is not:
(a) A relative of the patient by blood, marriage or adoption;
(b) A person who at the time the request is signed would be entitled to any portion of the
estate of the qualified patient upon death under any will or by operation of law; or
(c) An owner, operator or employee of a health care facility where the qualified patient is
receiving medical treatment or is a resident.
(3) The patient’s attending physician at the time the request is signed shall not be a
witness.
(4) If the patient is a patient in a long term care facility at the time the written request is
made, one of the witnesses shall be an individual designated by the facility and having
the qualifications specified by the Department of Human Services by rule. [1995 c.3
§2.02]
In section (1), a capable patient refers to one which has been deemed by a court, the attending
physician, or the patient’s psychiatrist to be fully rational, understanding, and able to effectively
communicate health care decisions (127.800 §1.01. Definitions). It is also important to highlight
that one of the witnesses must not be a relative to the patient in any way or in the person’s will in
order to ensure that there is no coercion on behalf of the family in order to acquire a percentage
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of the patient’s estate after death, or for other external, non-medical reasons (127.800 §1.01.
Definitions).Some healthcare providers argue that PAS and VE are inherently wrong moral acts
as they are essentially killing, and posit that it is not the duty of a physician to perform either of
these actions (Varelius 2013:229). Others argue that these actions are reasonable treatments that
fall within the umbrella of duties and obligations a physician holds to his or her patients. As
always, it is imperative to acknowledge the importance of respect for patient autonomy and the
patient’s conception and active pursuit of a good end. First, though, the specifics of killing
should be expanded upon.
This process in Oregon allows the physician to take a less active role in the patient’s death.
In Canada, however, patients have access to assisted suicide from physicians who take a moral
active role. Individuals have access to physician assisted suicide in Canada only if the following
criteria are met:
(a) they are eligible — or, but for any applicable minimum period of residence or waiting
period, would be eligible — for health services funded by a government in Canada;
(b) they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making decisions with respect to their
health;
(c) they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition;
(d) they have made a voluntary request for medical assistance in dying that, in particular,
was not made as a result of external pressure; and
(e) they give informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been
informed of the means that are available to relieve their suffering, including palliative
care. (Canada Bill C-14).
Eligibility refers to the patient being a rational adult and having a previous and
irremediable medical condition. The patient who meets these eligibility requirements then must
have at least two physicians and/or nurse practitioners who are independent from each other
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confirm that he has a grievous and irremediable medical condition. To be categorized as having
this type of medical condition, the patient must be categorized as the following:
(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;
(b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;
(c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical
or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under
conditions that they consider acceptable; and
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of
their medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the
specific length of time that they have remaining (Canada Bill C-14).
There have also been legal safeguards pit into place to protect vulnerable persons from
being coerced into committing suicide or from acting without full understanding of all options.
These safeguards are similar to those which are in place in the United States, and include having
two independent medical opinions and two independent non-medical witnesses who are not
beneficiary’s under the patient’s will, owners of the healthcare facility that the patient is being
cared for at, or are direct carers of the patient. There is also a ten day waiting period for a patient
to sign and date a written request to die which must be completed ten days from the date the
patient will die. The patient must also be made aware of other options such as palliative care,
express consent before death, and be able to decide to not follow through with the assisted
suicide.
Within both — Canada and the United States — practices of physician assisted suicide,
there are risks of strains on moral integrity. Physicians take a more passive, external role in
patient suicide in the United States, as they fill a prescription for a patient who will ingest the
prescription, fall asleep, and die without pain or suffering. In Canada, though, a physician might
take a more active role in assisting her patient’s suicide, as she may have to bring about death by
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lowering the power o a ventilator, essentially suffocating the patient in order to bring about
death. This act may strain the moral integrity of the physician who feels that physicians are
meant to be healers, not killers, and who perceives aiding in suicide to not be a beneficial act of
unorthodox healing, but rather as murder or killing.
People have different opinions regarding the physician’s role in assisted suicide. Some
believe that the procedure should only be carried out by a consenting physician, while others
believe that physicians have a duty to aid their patients in assisted suicide. Kamm addresses this
by providing a 4-step argument:
1. Doctors have a duty to treat pain, even if treatment will bring death sooner, when death
is a lesser evil and pain relief is a greater good, or when death is imminent and only
morphine can aid the patient. 2. Doctors then have a duty to intentionally cause evils and
do harm when the evils to be committed are lesser than the goods to be achieved. 3. All
assuming that death is a lesser or imminent evil because it is not different from other
lesser evils. 4. Therefore, doctors have a duty to cause their patient’s death when death is
a lesser evil than the suffering that the patient would suffer in the future (Kamm
2008:147).
Kamm refers to this argument as the Doctor’s Duty Argument. This argument is
founded, first, on the premise that physicians have a duty to treat pain in some situations even if
it will hasten death when the relief they are providing reduces suffering. The next premise of the
argument states that physicians may be required to commit some evils when the evil is
committed to achieve some greater good, such as over-prescribing morphine to a dying patient in
order to hasten death and ultimately relief. Lastly, Kamm states that death is a lesser evil
because it will end suffering that the patient is currently experiencing. Kamm concludes that
doctors have an obligation to bring on patient death when death will cause less suffering than the
patient would experience in the future. Some may argue that because of the professional ethic
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physicians are bound to, performing physician assisted suicide is forbidden. A doctor should
avoid unnecessary harm, and by keeping patients alive when their pain outweighs the potential
for good, the doctor is directly harming his patient. But while it may fall within a physician’s
duties to assist in suicide or perform euthanasia in certain scenarios, this does not require
physicians who feel deeply morally opposed to performing these actions to do so. This is
because physicians may potentially object to performing PAS or VE on the basis that they feel
that it conflicts with one of the core principles of medicine, to do no unnecessary harm. This
objection is founded in the belief that physicians should be healers and not killers and in
intentionally bringing on patient death, a physician is going against the goals of medicine.
Because this objection is founded in a core principle of medicine, it is reasonable, and thus an
objection that may be honored. Medicine is a moral enterprise which aims at protecting
humanity and human values and in turn prevents suffering. While preventing suffering of a
patient is of primary importance, there should still be respect for physician autonomy because of
the protection of human values that medicine seeks to provide. Therefore, physicians may elect
to aid in patient suicide or abstain altogether from providing this type of intervention.
In the medical world, PAS and VE are only provided to patients that are gravely ill with a
terminal diagnosis and a prognosis of less than six months to live, confirmed by more than one
physician (Death with Dignity). In order to determine what to do for a rational patient who
requests PAS or VE to be provided to them, a principle-based framework should be initially
consulted. A physician’s obligations include the following principles: respecting patient
autonomy, acting in accordance with the patient’s personal, physical, mental, and spiritual
conceptions of a good end, and doing no harm. If a patient is terminally ill with a short
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prognosis and feels on all levels that a good end would be one that includes PAS or VE, then it is
the duty of the physician to provide those treatments. A physician might experience a conflict of
interests in this scenario; personally, they feel that killing a patient is wrong, but they also feel
that the patient has a right to elect himself for PAS or VE if the above guidelines are met and the
patient feels it is a good end for himself (Sjöstrand et al., 2011:207). The physician should, in
this case, question how to act in accordance with being a responsible, autonomous, respected
doctor who upholds the principles of the medical community. A virtuous doctor is respectful,
knowledgeable, effective in treatment, and is trustworthy, and would acknowledge that a person
has a right to his or her own body, and that the patient will likely experience unnecessary mental
and spiritual suffering that could potentially be far worse than any physical pain that could be
brought on by disease or death if PAS or VE is not provided to the patient that desires it.
Therefore, the physician may elect to aid the patient or refer them to a different physician in
order to aid the patient in dying.
This is not to say that the autonomy and personal morals of the physician do not matter; it
is true that the physician may experience distress by performing certain treatments including PAS
and VE. This is why it is necessary to allow physicians to conscientiously object to performing
these interventions. However, the physician should act virtuously and in accordance with duty,
weighing her duties and obligations from an ethical standpoint in relation to the primary
principles of medicine. Therefore, the physician who is wholly opposed to the practice of
physician assisted suicide will experience a give and take of morals: she should accept that this
practice she finds deplorable is still being performed by those who perceive it to be a patient
right, but will also be able to retain some of her morals and autonomy by not being forced to
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perform this intervention. As directly stated before, though, the physician’s autonomy will be
respected but her conscience will still be conflicted. Ultimately, the physician will retain her
morality to a point and be able to provide treatments or refer and make decisions in the best
interest of his patients while respecting physician and patient autonomy and notion of the good.

Abortion
As has been stated earlier, the Church amendment is a legal provision which allows
physicians and other healthcare providers to object to performing certain services, such as
abortions, because doing so is “contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions” (Church
amendment). Abortion is a unique dilemma that physicians should deal with because it can be
argued that instead of dealing with only two parties (physician and patient), you are dealing with
three (physician, patient, and fetus). Claims of conscience in abortive services have famously
been debated throughout the years. Physicians, as has been discussed earlier, are sometimes
opposed to providing physician assisted suicide to a terminally ill patient who requests it.
Abortion adds yet another layer to this already morally difficult situation; we are now not only
dealing with a conflict of interests between a physician and a patient, but we are also dealing
with potentially terminating a fetus, which could be considered a human life with their own
rights.
Many factors should be considered when determining the permissibility of an abortion of
a healthy fetus, both from the view of the physician and of the patient. The patient might
experience unnecessary suffering both physically and mentally if forced to carry a fetus to full
term. However, there might be moral suffering experienced by the physician if he or she is
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deeply morally opposed to performing an abortion. Additionally, because — depending on one’s
beliefs and moral orientation — it could be argued that the fetus is a third party, the potential
pain and suffering that the fetus might experience should be taken into consideration. It can be
argued, then, that an abortion does not benefit ‘both’ patients — the fetus and the woman — or
any patient. Since the fetus is being terminated, it can be argued that the patient is killing and
causing harm. Additionally, because the woman might experience physical or emotional distress
from receiving an abortion or might be subject to social judgement or stigmatization, it can be
argued that she is experiencing suffering. If this is true, then what is the justification of
physicians providing abortions? Roe v. Wade, a landmark legal decision, determined that women
have a right to their body and thus a right to decide to receive an abortion, ultimately providing a
justification. Feminists have historically argued that women have a right to choose whether or
not to give birth and that it is not the decision of the government to deem whether a woman must
bear the pain and suffering of carrying a fetus to full term and then giving birth to that fetus when
she does not want to. Though some argue that providing an abortion causes harm to a patient, it
is also reasonable to argue that the harm caused by aborting a fetus is outweighed by the
alleviation of suffering that the woman will experience as a result of receiving a wanted or
needed abortion. Roe v. Wade has set laws and guidelines in order to determine a timeframe in
which it is acceptable to perform an abortion as well as provided protections for women’s
privacy (410 U.S. 113). This timeframe has been created in accordance with scientific research
and guidelines that have determined when the point of viability is, which is around 20-24 weeks
after conception (505 U.S. 833). Many physicians refuse to provide abortions beyond this point,
which is morally reasonable, as some argue it is the duty of physicians to be healers and by
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providing abortion, physicians are actively violating this duty. Some physicians still refuse to
provide early-term abortions on the basis that it is still a killing, which is inherently wrong and
immoral.
To come to a conclusion regarding this dilemma, it is important for the physician again to
reflect on his or her duties to the patient which have been formed to act in accordance with
medical principles. The emotional pain that a patient experiences from carrying a child full-term
may outweigh that of going through an abortion (Buchbinder et al. 2016:23). The same may be
said about a fetus which has no chance of survival once they are born at full-term because of
painful developmental impairments. As it is a physician’s duty to provide effective, rational, and
respectful treatment to their patients with a limited amount of pain, it is reasonable to argue that
it is within the obligations of a physician to provide abortions for their patients. This being said,
it is important to retain respect for the physician’s autonomy as well, allowing physicians to
object to performing abortions for both healthy and terminal fetuses if referrals are made to a
second physician who is willing to perform the procedure. What is unique about moral
dilemmas in medicine is that often, no matter which action is taking, there is still a sort of
‘remainder,’ morally; not everything gets perfectly squared away. In cases of PAS and abortion
in which either physician or patient feels a moral dilemma, there will be no entirely right answer
or entirely wrong answer. There are multiple actions that can be made such as providing the
abortion against one’s morals, or referring the patient to a different physician, or the patient just
opting out of having an abortion. None of these will always be the right answer, and this is the
nature of all moral predicaments, not just of medical moral dilemmas. However, what is unique
about medicine is the fact that it is a moral and a human enterprise, aiming at protecting
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humanistic values and alleviating suffering. Therefore, it is necessary for physicians to consider
which course of action will cause the least amount of suffering for their patient.
In this discussion of moral compromise, it is important to explore the notion of
forgiveness in the medical context. It is not just patients who feel moral obligations in spiritual,
medical, and personal contexts; physicians also deal with this conflict, as has been explored
previously. Physicians have a unique responsibility to their patients in that the rational wishes of
the patients should come before the physician’s personal conception of the good, necessitating
self-forgiveness in situations which physicians feel they are violating their morals or even
religion. In situations in which the physician objects to performing a certain procedure, such as
an abortion, but there are no other physicians willing and available to perform the procedure,
then that physician should perform the procedure because of the primary duty of the physician to
treat his patients and act in their best interest. While the physician, in this case, should bear
suffering of conscience, it is imperative that this suffering is weighed against the suffering
experienced by the patient who might also suffer consciously, mentally, and physically. The
patient who is refused treatment with no alternative way to receive it may be left with a physical
stigma or deformity that the patient should bear along with her suffering. Because the patient
ultimately takes priority in the medical realm, the physician is required to provide these services
in this limited scenario. Self-forgiveness is “of particular relevance to the practice of doctoring,
given the culture of the medical profession as it currently exists” (Ivanhoe, et al. 2007: 88).
Because of the professionalism of medicine which requires physicians to adhere to a set of high
standards as ultimate healers who avoid mistakes and imperfections, there is a deep sense of guilt
felt when this reputation is not upheld, even in the personal, internal sense which arises in the
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discussion of the give and take of moral values (Ivanhoe et al, 2007:89). Physicians may feel
this guilt when there is a conflict between their interests and the interests which are best for the
patient.
A common scenario in which this specific type of conflict arises is when a physician is
caring for someone who is incurable; that is, someone who has a fatal disease or illness with no
realistic chance of recovery or survival. Physicians often feel a type of invulnerability and need
to control natural consequences such as death or disease (Ivanhoe, et al. 2007:104). When a
physician is faced with a terminal patient, there might be anxiety about how to treat this patient
when no treatment is available. Patient abandonment is morally reprehensible as it violates
multiple obligations held by the physician in addition to many core values of medicine, and some
treatment options may not be enough to assuage the pain experienced by these terminal diseases.
Some physicians might be content with simply providing palliative pain management to their
patients until death. If this plan is in accordance with the patient’s wishes and conception of the
good, then there is no conflict of interest. However, a different patient may wish to have
physician-assisted suicide provided to him. In this case, the rational patient’s conception of the
good on all levels — personal, medical, spiritual, and at large — have caused them to come to
the conclusion for various reasons that an assisted euthanasia is the most dignified death. The
doctor has a duty to his patient to provide medical assistance which is congruous with the
patient’s active pursuit of the good, thus necessitating the physician’s obligation to aid in the
patient’s suicide — but this might be at odds with the physician’s own morals. Therefore, selfforgiveness is necessary; the truly virtuous physician is one who, when confronted with a
conflict which he knows will cause some moral distress to himself, chooses the plan of action
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which best benefits his patient and her conception of the good, whether that is providing the
treatment himself or referring the patient to a different willing and capable physician. It is
imperative that the physician fully understands the notion of ‘give and take’ in the morality of
clinical medicine and that the decisions that have been made in the best interest of the patient are
morally best, and that self-forgiveness functions as “a corrective to erroneous or unreasonable
beliefs about one’s fault and hence unreasonable self-blame” (Ivanhoe, et al. 2007:105). There
are still opponents to these suggestions of how to deal with conflicts of conscience and
autonomy, though, and it is important that they are addressed.
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Chapter 7: Objections to Theory and Application to Cases
We allow physicians to elect to conscientiously object because we live in a country
where it is permissible to refuse services to individuals based on personal beliefs and autonomy
that conflicts with the core values of medicine, though there are opponents to this reasoning.
Julian Savulescu, a rejector of conscientious objection, argues that refusing medical treatment
because it is not in line with your personal beliefs is wrong and prejudiced (2006:294). He
argues that a doctor’s personal values and conscience should not interfere with providing
treatment, all doctors and medical students should be aware of the duties and obligations
associated with being a doctor, and physicians who object to providing care and thus
compromise the care of their patients should be disciplined (Savulescu 2006:296). While it is
true that patient autonomy takes priority, it is damaging to the medical field to say that physician
autonomy carries no weight. It is important that physicians are considered to be autonomous
moral agents by themselves and by their patients as open communication between physician and
patient will be fostered allowing medicine to be practiced as a moral enterprise. Savulescu
specifically concludes the following:
Values are important parts of our lives. But values and conscience have different roles in
public and private life. They should influence discussion on what kind of health system
to deliver. But they should not influence the care an individual doctor offers to his or her
patient. The door to “value-driven medicine” is a door to a Pandora’s box of
idiosyncratic, bigoted, discriminatory medicine. Public servants should act in the public
interest, not their own (Savulescu 2006:297).
In a medical situation, Savulescu calls doctors indispensable instruments in carrying
out a medical treatment and states that individuals “should not be doctors” if not prepared to
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provide legally permitted treatment (Savulescu 2006:294). In essence, Savulescu’s argument
against conscientious objection is founded in the reasoning that it will weaken the medical
profession overall, infringing upon patient autonomy and respect for physicians.
There have been several additional narrowed arguments against conscientious objection
that have also been suggested, the first of which revolves around inefficiency and inequity
associated with conscientiously objecting to providing treatments (Savulescu 2006:295). A study
cited by Savulescu has shown that less than half of clinical geneticists and obstetricians were
prepared and willing to perform an abortion at or before the pregnancy reached 13 weeks
(Savulescu 2006:295). Savulescu says that these findings are troubling because it is the job of
these specialists to provide this service to patients. If the population of physicians willing to
perform this service minimizes, there is a risk of patients being inconvenienced and potentially
left uninformed (Wicclair 2006:295).
The issue of inconsistency is also cited as a reason to reject conscientious objection;
Savulescu references the hypothetical situation in which a physician refuses to provide treatment
for patients over the age of 70 because he believes that these people have already lived a good
life and thus are not deserving of receiving care, as it is a wasteful use of limited medical
resources and time (Savulescu 2006:295). It is not acceptable for physicians to refuse providing
treatment on the sole basis of self-interest or opinions such as the one in this scenario because
acting in the best interest of the patient is one of the primary principles that guide medical action.
This principle entails providing treatment for those at any age, regardless of an individual’s
conception of how many years it takes to complete a full life.
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It is also true that doctors have special commitments to their patients that they should
accept in order to become a doctor (Savulescu 2006:295). Savulescu states “[t]o be a doctor is to
be willing and able to offer appropriate medical interventions that are legal, beneficial, desired
by the patient, and a part of a just healthcare system” (Savulescu 2006:295). This is all entirely
true, but what is part of a just healthcare system is in line with the a priori principles of medicine:
treat the patient, respect autonomy, and act in accordance with the patient’s conception of the
good. Treatments which are regarded as entirely beneficial and rational by the majority of
recognized and respected physicians fall within the realm of a just healthcare system and its
principles, and treatments which are required and are thus not usually the focus of consciencebased objections. However, more contentious acts of care such as abortion and physician
assisted suicide do not necessarily fall perfectly within the guidelines associated with these
principles depending on physician morals and conception of ‘doing no harm’; physicians may
elect to perform these, and other physicians may decide to decline to provide these treatments
and refer the patient to a different, willing doctor when objections are founded in conflicts of
value relating to the core values of medicine and the physician’s identity as a moral doctor. Both
decisions are morally permissible when in line with the guidelines of reasonable conscientious
objection as both respect the autonomy of the patient and the physician.
What Savulescu so crucially neglects to consider in all of his arguments is the fact
that medicine aims at protecting humanistic values. By enforcing a strict, detached culture of
medicine, there will be high levels of suffering experienced by patient and physician because of
the lack of humanistic protection of values. Savulescu’s argument against conscientious
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objection is weak because medicine is founded on the basis of trust and respect between
physician and patient. This means respecting the autonomy of both patient and physician.
While I agree with Savulescu on the premise that physicians have a duty to their patients to
provide adequate medical treatment as a primary principle of medicine, there should be a mutual
respect of personal and professional morals and autonomy between both parties, as medicine is a
humanistic and moral enterprise. A patient may object to receiving treatment if the request is
rational, and the physician should honor that. Similarly, the physician should be allowed to
object to providing certain services if those objections are founded in the doctor’s conception of
herself as a moral physician. Doctors are moral agents — similarly to how we all are agents
capable of making moral decisions, and thus should honor all of their values, both person and
professional. Conscientious objection allows these morals to be upheld in a procedural, rational,
and fair way. Savulescu’s argument is in fact contradictory, as allowing for conscientious
objection will increase trust in the medical community as physicians and patients will be able to
have open, honest communication and practice medicine in an earnest, effective manner.
In regard to Savulescu’s argument on inefficiency and inequity appealing to OB-GYNs
unwilling to provide abortions, there are many responsibilities other than providing abortions
that obstetricians have, such as providing birth control, women’s health screenings, and treatment
for other conditions. Despite the fact that a significant proportion of OB-GYNs are not willing
to provide an abortion, adequate treatment can still be provided to patients outside of that
specific procedure. This fact still does not minimize the effects of having OB-GYNs who are
unwilling to provide abortions. While physicians may elect to not perform these types of
procedures, it is imperative that physicians refer their patient to a physician who is trained and
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willing to perform such procedures. While the physician may feel that his morals are still being
conflicted because of his referral to a different physician to still carry out the procedure he finds
morally wrong, it is the duty of the objecting physician to aid his patient in finding care. This is
where the give and take of morality takes place again, as the physician should acknowledge that
the procedure will ultimately happen, though at the hands of the other doctor. Ultimately,
autonomy of both parties continues to be respected, as the physician is not forced to perform a
treatment he finds morally abhorrent, and the patient will receive the procedure she desires.
Savulescu neglects to consider the nuanced approach which gives importance to
autonomy and morals of physicians and patients, and instead argues for a narrow and deficient
view of conscientious objection that does not consider these required aspects of adequate
medicine. Refusing to provide treatment can be seen as prejudiced because some argue that it
looks down upon or shames the values of patients and may make the patient being refused
treatment feel that they are being judged for their medical wants. Savulescu goes so far as to say
denying a treatment to an eligible, autonomous candidate is malpractice, as the physician is not
providing treatment and could be perceived as acting negligently (2006:294). He argues that
denying treatment directly results in a loss of integrity of the profession and reflects lack of
morality of the professional and of the profession overall.
Savulescu and Schuklenk, a philosopher who takes a stance similar to Savulescu, have
responded to criticisms regarding the lack of success their arguments in opposition to
conscientious objection have had in influencing any type of legislative change, explaining that
the prominence of organized religion in our society is to blame (Savulescu et al. 2017:162).
They argue that though our society is not entirely religious, that many of the protections written
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into the constitutions of our institutions — medical, governmental, educational — were
implemented during times that were heavily influenced by religious forces (Savulescu et al.
2017:162). This point is true, though only to a point. While guidelines were implemented due to
the heavy influence of religion during earlier times, there are still many people who identify with
the morals that religion has imposed. The religiosity of past societies has also influenced today’s
institutions, shaping our morals and even our professional behavior. Today, there is more
diversity of religions that are practiced in society, but many of these religions have the same core
values: do no avoidable harm, forgive, give more than you receive, respect others, etc. Many
religions also consider human intervention in death such as in abortions or assisted suicide to be
immoral and a sin, while some other individuals -- potentially religious -- view performing these
services to those in need a moral good. Because of the diversity of influences on morals and the
diversity of religious interpretation, differing conceptions of professionalism, and ultimately
individual autonomy, should be respected. Religion has played a role in the formation of our
society today, and though we should not allow religion to heavily dictate medicine, it is
reasonable to acknowledge religious influences on autonomy that an individual, whether she is a
physician or a patient, may hold. These facts necessitate the availability of conscientious
objection in order to respect the autonomy of the diverse physician population.
There is not a general agreement about religious, spiritual, or personal morals that a
physician should have outside of those listed in the Hippocratic Oath — a consideration
Savulescu fails to take. Therefore, physicians are allowed to object on the behalf of other
personal values and autonomy, if they are in line with medical values, as there is a difference
between those and the interest of self. Referring back to the trust and respect-based relationship
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between physician and patient and the emphasis on humanity that should be made, the issue of
inconsistency is realized not to be an issue. As stated earlier, different individuals may have
different conceptions of a good end in accordance with their autonomy. The physician is
expected to respect these differing opinions of his patients and not refer to them as
‘inconsistencies.’ This same respect should be given to physicians as well, who are entitled to
having differing morals, and thus are allowed to object to performing certain services that
conflict with their conception of themselves as a moral, virtuous physician and autonomous
actor.
It may be true that we are allowing religion to infiltrate medicine to a high degree, but
this is a reflection of our society. Medicine should be equipped to deal with the population at
hand, and physicians are members of that larger population. All members of society have had
past experiences and influences that have shaped their morals and views on autonomy. These
factors then ultimately consciously, or subconsciously, dictate an individual’s professional
behaviors, as well. Earning the title of ‘doctor’ does not exempt someone from having morals
that have been acquired through religious influences; a physician has still been brought up in a
society that has external influences that shape morals. Because medicine is for the people, there
should be an acceptance of religious diversity for the patients as well as for the physicians. One
rational physician may conceive doing no harm differently than a second rational physician due
to religious, spiritual, or other personal experiences and influences. To not honor reasonable
requests of conscientious objection would be to use physicians as a mere means, which is
immoral in itself. It is imperative that the morals and the autonomy of physicians are respected
within the moral enterprise that is the institution of medicine.
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To support conscientious objection is not to allow every request of conscientious
objection to be honored, as has been suggested by opponents of conscientious objection. Only
those requests that meet the five guidelines created by Wicclair in addition to the extra guideline
that has been put forth earlier should be honored: (1) conscience-based objections have more
weight when they are based on the central values of the physician (Wicclair 2000:221). (2)
When there are notable differences from respected professionals regarding requests of
conscientious objection in respect to medical norms, there are also differences in the moral
weight of these values, (Wicclair 2000:222). (3) Conscience-based objections are more morally
significant when central to the physician’s conception of herself as an ethical physician rather
than an ethical individual or member of any other group (Wicclair 2000:224). (4) Whenever
possible, the patients’ rights and interests should not be compromised (Wicclair 2000:225). (5)
The competing values that an individual experiences can have more or less moral weight and it is
advisable to allow norms to guide a comparison of these interests (Wicclair 2000:226). The sixth
clause I suggest states that (6) a requested accommodation will only be honored if it does not
inflict high levels of physical, mental, or spiritual pain on the patient. The physician who makes
such ridiculous requests akin to the ones that Savulescu has mentioned — such as the
gynecologist who refuses to perform internal exams — would never have his requests honored
because the value that the objection is based off of is not in line with any of the values of
medicine. The problem with Savulescu’s argument is that he neglects to consider that
conscientious objection is only permissible in situations where there is a conflict of professional
morals and medical norms that threaten a physician’s identity as a moral physician, and lack of
consensus surrounding the morality of the issue among the respected medical community.
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What we must respond to this argument against conscientious objection, above all else, is
this: it is not permissible to allow requests for conscientious objection founded solely in religious
or personal values. These requests must be founded in or seen to potentially effect the
physician’s ability to be perceived as and act as a moral, virtuous physician. An example of an
unacceptable religious request for exemption would be a physician who refuses to provide an
abortion because, as a Catholic, the physician is prohibited from performing such an act.
According to the physician, doing so would result in the physician being a bad Catholic. This
differs from the acceptable request, in which a Catholic physician refuses to provide an abortion
because he feels, because of his religiously influenced values, that doing so is killing, not
healing, which goes against the goals of medicine and thus causes the physician to act without
professionalism and not act as a moral physician. The crucial distinction lies in that the adequate
request for conscientious objection is based in the physician’s conception of himself as a moral
physician, rather than a moral individual. The abstaining physician should provide reasons for
objecting that are founded in his conception of professionalism, which may or may not be
affected by religiously inherited values. Wicclair has provided a realistic and useful set of
guidelines that should be referred to in order to deem the acceptability of requests for
conscience-based objections.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
Physicians are subject to a certain ‘give and take’ of morals in the medical arena, as
they are required to potentially sacrifice their own conscience in order to provide reasonable,
safe, effective, and desired treatment to their patients. Fortunately, there are guidelines set up
within the American healthcare system to ensure the protection of morals of both patients and
physicians. When physicians have moral objections to providing a certain service that are in line
with one or more of the core values of medicine, a request for conscientious objection may be
made. Wicclair has created five guidelines that should be adhered to in order to honor the
objection once it has been determined to be in line with the core values of medicine: (1) the
objection will have more moral weight if based on beliefs that are central to the physician’s
identity, (2) -- which should be adhered to cautiously -- the objection is given more weight if the
consensus about the action’s morality varies greatly among respected professionals within the
field, (3) there is more weight given to the objection when it is concerned with the doctor’s
conception of herself as an ethical physician, not just an ethical individual, (4) the
accommodation of objection should always aim, when honored, to be completed without
infringing upon the patient’s rights and interests, and lastly, (5) each proposal of objection should
be considered individually, as certain values can carry more weight than others (Wicclair
2000:221-227). I argue that a sixth clause should also be implemented into the deciding process,
which is built off of the fourth clause that Wicclair provides. A request to conscientiously object
to performing a certain treatment should only be honored when it does not inflict serious pain on
the patient — physical, mental, or spiritual. It is not up to the medical community to judge those
whose religion or personal experiences have shaped their morals, no matter how different from
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their own morals they may be. The United States is a diverse country which is home to many
individuals from different backgrounds. Religion has played a major role in the development of
this country and all of its different institutions, and so its effects on the moral foundations of the
people of this nation should also be respected. Fortunately, the option of conscientious objection
based on the six guidelines set out before allows the morals of patients and physicians to be
retained and medicine to be practiced as a moral enterprise.
Conscientious objection, though, should be a last resort and not a first choice when
physicians are confronted with a challenging medical dilemma. Current models of ethics
education in medical schools — ethics-as-character and ethics-as-virtue — are lacking in
teaching physicians to make medical decisions regarding patient treatment in accordance with
their duties and their humanity in an attached and compassionate way. The pressures of medical
school and the medical field as a whole often cause young medical professionals to have to
balance conflicting obligations. By employing the use of ethics concerned with duty as well as
encouraging an interpretive model of doctor-patient interaction, the negative effects brought on
in high-stakes medical dilemmas can be mediated. This new ethics curriculum required
physicians to consider themselves as first and foremost a physician and to weigh their duties and
obligations that they have to their patient over any other obligations. The physicians should
consider the patient’s conception of the good on all levels — physical, mental, emotional and
spiritual — and provide treatment in accordance with that. This is related to the interpretive
model of physician-patient interaction, as this model creates guidelines that guide the physician
in helping the patient realize their core values and morals. The physician refers to the patient not
just as a medical problem that needs to be treated, but as an individual with a past and a future.
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The interpretive model allows the physician to view the patient as an entire narrative, providing
treatment options that are in line with the patient’s conception of the good and aiding the patient
in making the best, most well-informed decisions. This model, combined with a deep
understanding of duty, will allow future physicians to be adequately trained in ethics in order to
create an environment where medical dilemmas can be handled more efficiently.
Admittedly, bioethical and medical ethical recommendations are usually very attractive
on paper though still face occasional complications and limitations when put into practice. This
is because ethical theories of medicine attempt to combine the abstract — theories — with the
concrete — the application of these theories in medical treatment. Medicine is a complicated
institution because of its direct impact on the health and wellbeing of humans, and so no
bioethical theory will be entirely foolproof. However, the ethical theory and ethics training I
have argued for — one which is based on humanity and the use of an interpretive model of
interaction — is most useful in today’s society. This is because it considers the patient as an
autonomous, rational agent, which is something that past models of medicine have failed to do
because of the high level of paternalism that physicians were expected to exercise. This model
of ‘give and take’ allows physicians to exercise a reasonable level of paternalism over their
patients, allowing for medicine to still be practiced effectively and properly while introducing
humanism and compassion. These traits will allow medicine to be practiced as a moral
enterprise while acknowledging the influence that external factors such as family, upbringing,
experiences, and religion have had on the formation of morality of patients and physicians alike.
Furthermore, physicians will be allowed to make conscience-based objections in order to
preserve their own morals as well. This theory has limitations, though, in that ethics is a
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subjective discipline. It is difficult to assign a definitive weight or worth to an individual’s
morals, because different beings value certain morals more than others. Therefore, there might
be dissimilarities between the values between patient and doctor that the guidelines for
reasonable conscientious objection cannot address. Despite these limitations, this theory should
be adopted when we consider what is at stake; if these changes are not implemented, then the
institution of medicine will fail to operate successfully as a moral enterprise.
It is crucial that ethics education for physicians is improved upon because it is
unrealistic to rely entirely on ethics review boards -- an objection cited by those who are opposed
to putting ethical responsibility on the physicians. There would be serious practical and
professional implications if referring to an ethics committee is a first option. It blasphemous to
say that external review boards are to be consulted whenever there is an ethical dilemma at hand;
doing so would result in wasted time and resources and would result in physicians who are
unaware of the moral implications of practicing medicine -- a discouraging consideration given
that medicine is a moral enterprise. There would also be a loss of respect and trust experienced
by the physician whose patient’s perceive her as a treatment-providing agent who is ignorant to
the moral and ethical implications that are associated with medicine. The patient might feel she
is at risk of receiving care that is not in her best interest or that her interests are not even being
considered during a dilemma, as the physician might only consider his best interest in order to
preserve medical integrity. It is necessary for physicians to be aware and well-practiced in the
realm of ethics relating to medicine in order to effectively communicate with patients on a
human level and provide treatment that is in line with many of the numerous conflicting tensions
that physicians are subjected to.
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Future research on this issue should center around recurring moral themes within highstake medical dilemmas. Studies should focus on the most common morals and factors which
are considered important to patients and physicians when there are conflicting opinions regarding
the morality of a certain medical intervention. For example, consider an interaction between a
patient, a senior physician, and a young medical intern. The patient is requesting a certain
treatment, such as a bariatric surgery for weight loss, and the medical intern has considered all
available options, the patient’s history -- which includes struggling to lose weight because of preexisting conditions--, and the available resources and deems the bariatric surgery an acceptable
line of action. The patient values her autonomy and being considered a rational agent who is
capable of making decisions. The intern has been trained in a time where patient autonomy is
given much value and the physician has a duty to his patient to provide the best treatment
available that is in line with the patient’s wishes. However, the senior physician disagrees, and
believes that the patient does not require the surgery and should thus lose the weight by
‘traditional’ means, including diet and exercise.
This recommendation by the senior physician is not meant to be dismissive of the
patient and her wishes, but is rather a reflection of his training, in which paternalism was
encouraged and the physician was deemed as an agent incapable of doing wrong if the correct
considerations were made (available resources, other options, necessity of treatment, etc.). In
this scenario, the intern might have a more modern outlook on medicine and give more value to
the wants of the patient, while the attending physician’s suggestions might solely be a reflection
of the time in which he was trained when the norm was for medicine to be practiced entirely
paternalistically with no real consideration given to the patient’s desires. The two physicians will
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then give more weight to different values and environmental pressures considering the
generation they are from, their upbringing, the type of ethics training they have received, and the
culture of medicine that they were exposed to when undergoing this medical training.
By making ethics training a more universal and objective practice, guidelines regarding
moral weight assigned to certain personal values based on the prevalence that they are cited as
being important by affected individuals can be integrated into existing professional
documentation. This will result in physicians across the nation and from different generations
applying ethics in medical situations using the same standards, making it a less subjective
practice. Future research can be narrowed and focused in order to build upon and strengthen this
theory, increasing its effectiveness in achieving much-needed change within the education of
ethics of our medical community.
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